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Going Private
INTRODUCTION
Despite ciches about "Internet speed," disputes that arise on and
about the Internet can be time-consuming to resolve, legally murky, and
factually complex. In response, Internet players with market power are
opting out; mandatory arbitration is replacing both substantive law and
court procedure and technological "remedies" are providing self-help
without any "dispute resolution" at all. These alternative procedures
tend to move faster than courts and cost their corporate creators less than
lawsuits. They are also structured to maximize the success of the
powerful. But faster is not always better. Cheap is not always fair or
accurate. Market power is not always used to achieve the public good.
And the power to make the rules is often the power to win the game.
The Internet is a largely privatized world, and private actors are creating
structures under which governments and their courts are increasingly
irrelevant.2
This article will discuss four important contexts in which Internet
disputes have become privatized in ways that provide substantial
advantages to the already-powerful: 1) the domain name dispute policy
of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),
a form of mandatory online arbitration for the benefit of trademark
owners; 2) the safe harbor take-down provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act,3 encouraging an Internet service provider to
remove content from Web sites, without prior notice to the Web site
owner, whenever a copyright holder alleges infringement; 3) "trusted
systems" and the use of "digital rights management technology" to
provide computer-activated self-help to those seeking to impose and
automatically enforce contract terms, even terms at variance with real
world substantive law; and 4) contractual "shrinkwrap" or "cickwrap"
clauses creating their own "law" by mandating binding arbitration in
Michael E. Schneider & Christopher Kuner, Dispute Resolution in International
Electronic Commerce, J. INT'L ARB., Sept. 1997, at 5, 10-11. In addition to the complexity
inherent in most disputes, Internet transactions may also involve persons from multiple
states or nations whose dealings with each other did not take place in physical space, were
not based on face-to-face encounters, and are not clearly governed by the law of a
particular jurisdiction or international treaty.
2 The impact of the computer chip on the future of civil procedure may thus be even
more drastic than that envisioned by Professor Carrington in his 1998 article. Paul D.
Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan's Celestial City, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1516 (1998).
' Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (Supp. IV 1998)
[hereinafter DMCA]; see also Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (originally H.R. 2281,
105th Cong. (2d Sess. 1998)).
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consumer transactions.4
If left unchecked, these privatized systems and their probable
technological extensions will have several consequences for the power of
courts as institutions and for due process to litigants. First, they result in
privatized justice. These processes take place independently, with little
or no participation or sanction from government actors. Rather, private
or even automated decision makers have sole power to control the rights
of the parties. Second, the processes shift procedural advantage to
certain powerful players. Rules can be designed to promote desired
outcomes. Interim relief can be obtained without the need to prove
irreparable injury or probable success on the merits and without a
balancing of interests. Third, the mechanisms do not protect certain
traditional components of due process in dispute resolution. Aspects of
litigation such as affordable access to justice, notice, discovery, collective
action, live hearings, confrontation of witnesses, a neutral decision
maker, and a transparent process may be absent from these privatized
processes. Fourth, by eliminating the courts as the arbiters of disputes,
these processes decrease the power of government to shape and enforce
substantive law. The "law" becomes what is specified in the contract or
programmed into the software, and courts lose the ability to enforce
mandatory rules and to subject contractual "law" to the needs of public
policy.5 These privatized systems can result in granting trademark
owners protection they would not be granted under trademark law,
copyright owners rights to prevent or license publications that they
could not control under copyright law, and sellers rights to impose terms
they could not impose under commercial law. They need not include
public interests, such as free speech, an intellectual commons, and
consumer protection, that real world governments balance against
private property rights.
Governments can sit back and let this happen, or they can choose to
intervene. Neither voluntary industry self-regulation nor ad hoc case
law developments will be enough to assure that important values are
protected in Internet dispute resolution. Rather than repeat platitudes
' This article addresses only arbitration clauses that are imposed ex ante in
transactions between a business and a consumer, especially those included in standard
form contracts of adhesion. It does not question the potential benefits of arbitration clauses
genuinely negotiated between parties with equal bargaining power, voluntary mediation
programs, or even arbitration options meaningfully presented to a consumer after a
dispute has arisen when there is no attached exhaustion requirement.
' Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV.




about the "unique qualities of the Internet" 6 we must choose the shape of
dispute resolution for the future.
Section I of this article discusses the philosophy of privatization that
prevails on the Internet. It describes how this philosophy has developed
from the libertarian notions of the early Net users to the laissez faire
market freedom of the "new economy." Section II describes four
situations in which technology, private contract, and government
encouragement and/or acquiescence have privatized Internet dispute
resolution. Section III considers the consequences of this trend toward
privatization for the parties, society, and government.
I. PRIVATIZATION AND THE INTERNET
Since its scientific beginnings, 7 the Internet has been largely self-
regulated. That de facto status has come to be seen as a sort of natural
phenomenon or political entitlement. Early Net architects deliberately
8designed a system based on open code and the sharing of information.
The "Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace" expresses traditional
libertarian Internet values:
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and
steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of
the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone.. You are not
welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I
address you with no greater authority than that with which liberty
itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we are
building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to
impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you
6 The White House, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (July 1, 1997),
http://www.ecommerce.gov/framewrk.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2000) [hereinafter
Magaziner Report], at 3.
' For general history of the development of the Internet and World Wide Web, see
Douglas Dangerfield, Web Surfing, or "The Internetfor the Uninformed", AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Mar. 1996, available at 1996 ABI JNL. LEXIS 496; Walt Howe, Delphi FAQs: A Brief History of
the Internet, at http://www.delphi.com/navnet/history.html (last modified Sept. 24, 2000);
David P. Miranda, Defamation in Cyberspace: Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,
5 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 229, 230-31 (1996); Bruce Sterling, Short History of the Internet, THE
MAGAZINE OF FANTASY AND SCIENCE FICTION, Feb. 1993, at F&SF Science Column #5,
available at http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/BruceSterling/FSFcolumns
/fsf.05 (last visited Dec. 5, 2000).
' Lawrence Lessig, Open Code and Open Societies: Values of Internet Governance, 74 CH.-
KENT L. REV. 1405, 1406,1410-1415 (1999).
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possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear.9
The early Net users were scientists and academics, and they used the
Internet to collaborate and trade information. However, the
development of the World Wide Web, including its graphics, colors,
links, and browsers made it a medium that could be used easily by the
public at large, and in 1991 the Internet was opened to commercial use.10
In 1995, the World Wide Web took off, with the number of users growing
at a rate of twenty percent per month." As many as 90 million
Americans now regularly use the Internet, and about 69% of them
shopped online in the third quarter of 1999.1' The ideological hostility to
government intervention shared by early Internet enthusiasts has now
been bolstered by the free market vision of the commercial users.
"Privatization is all the rage" 13 in commercial law, and it is perhaps
nowhere as popular as on the Internet.14 Some cyber-theorists argue that
Web "governance" should be created by Web users rather than imposed
by the government. This law created by contract is alleged to be both
more efficient 5 and more fair than whatever a traditional legal system
' John Perry Barlow, A Cyberspace Independence Declaration (Feb. 9, 1996), at
http://www.eff.org/pub/Publications/ohn-Perry-Barlow/barlow_0296.declaration
(setting forth principles of Electronic Frontier Foundation, organization created for purpose
of protecting Internet from government intervention).
10 This overturned the policy that commercial traffic was not an acceptable use of the
publicly-funded information infrastructure.
" Dangerfield, supra note 7, at *4-*5.
" Tech giants suggest rules to protect Net shoppers, REUTERS (June 6, 2000),
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1007-200-2026227.html (last visited June 22, 2000) (on file
with author).
" Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703, 704 (1999). For a discussion of privatized procedure and
substantive law in the tort context, see Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort
Litigation: The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413 (1999)
(explaining shift from public law model of mass tort litigation to hybrid form that shares
attributes of both private law and public law models).
" Mark A. Lemley, The Law & Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CH.-KENT L. REv. 1257,
1257 (1998).
'" "In the world of the Web, service providers are better than lawmakers at creating
effective ways to resolve conflicts and regulate wrongdoing by users...." David R.
Johnson, Industry and Government Have Swapped Traditional Roles of Advocacy and Oversight in
Shaping Internet Policy, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 12, 1998, at 28; see David G. Post & David R.
Johnson, Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent: Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-
Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1055, 1086-88 (1998) (arguing that
allowing individuals to define limits of their movement in and out of governing bodies will
allow for faster responses to trends in Internet). Such theorists often refer to desirable Net
ordering as "bottom-up," a term coined by Freidrich Hayek that refers to "the laissez-faire
network of promises among individuals, the growing-up of customary norms" (good), as





Sometimes this privatization is outward and visible as, for example,
with a contractual clause calling for mandatory binding arbitration.
Sometimes this exercise of power is hidden because it is embedded in the
very architecture of the Internet. When a result is compelled by software
programming, or by the way the Internet is structured, it obtains the
power of law.17 Some enthusiasts, in fact, look forward to the day when
computer code makes courts unnecessary. Bill Frezza, in Internet Week,
envisioned complete automation of Internet dispute resolution and
enforcement: "What if there were a way... that does not rely on judicial
intervention to interpret rights or the police power of the state to enforce
them? A way in which laws, along with their enforcement, could be
designed into the products or transactions themselves?"
8
Ironically, this freedom from government control is supported by the
government. 19 In 1997, the Clinton Administration released a document
setting out a blueprint for the promotion of electronic commerce. 20 The
"Framework for Global Electronic Commerce" (more commonly called
Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CmI.-
KENT L. REv. 1295, 1297 (1998) (criticizing ideal of "private ordering" in cyberspace).
6 See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (arguing that architecture of cyberspace precludes notice of
governing law that is crucial to law's legitimacy, and that "spillover" effects lead to
application of law of nation with no right to govern particular transaction); see also Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal Democratic
Theory, 88 CAL. L. REv. 395, 401 (2000) (explaining that for supporters of cyberspace self-
government, "cyberspace is partly a model and partly a metaphor for a fundamental
restructuring of our political institutions"). Professor Netanel further notes:
Cyberians view cyberspace as a realm in which 'bottom-up private ordering' can
and, indeed, should supplant rule by the distant, sluggish, and unresponsive
bureaucratic state. By its very architecture and global reach, they contend,
cyberspace will ultimately elude the strictures of state-created law, challenging
the efficacy and theoretical underpinnings of the territorial sovereign state.
Id.
17 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (Basic Books 1999)
(asserting that code is law); see also James Boyce, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance,
Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CiN. L. REv. 177 (1997) (discussing government
and power on Internet); Lessig, supra note 5 (discussing some problems of regulation in
cyberspace and suggesting particular approach to resolving question of regulation).
"8 Bill Frezza, How the Internet Will Change the Rule of Law, INTERNET WEEK, Sept. 22,
1997, available at 1997 WL 12653363 (emphasis added).
19 "Not since the days of oil barons and railway tycoons has Washington been so in the
thrall of a group of corporate executives." Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Getting to Know the Hill,
TIME, Aug. 14,2000, at B12, B15, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
articles/0,3266,52104,00.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2000).
Magaziner Report, supra note 6.
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the "Magaziner Report") is organized around a set of principles
encouraging privatization:
* "The private sector should lead."
"Governments should avoid undue restrictions on electronic
commerce."
* "Where governmental involvement is needed, its aim should be to
support and enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent and
simple legal environment for commerce."
21
While the Magaziner Report notes that government action may be
necessary to protect consumers, its general rule is that "parties should be
able to do business with each other on the Internet under whatever terms
and conditions they agree upon." 22 As Professor Michael Froomkin has
pointed out, the Magaziner Report portrays "the private sector ... in its
heroic mode, needing only to have moribund rules removed to allow its
unleashed animal spirits to carry the day. In effect, the private sector
rules, or should rule." 23 The role of the government is to provide a legal
environment that allows private parties to rely on and enforce the deals
they have made and to take full advantage of what technology makes
24possible.
This combination of private forces, government cooperation, and
technological feasibility is creating a disturbing trend. The courts are
being marginalized and squeezed out of dispute resolution. When the
technology of the Internet is capable of providing a remedy attractive to
those with the power to design it, there is incentive to use it. When the
"law", procedural as well as substantive, is unappealing, a combination
of contract and technology minimize its impact. Further, the benefits of
this privatization are not evenly distributed but result in some clear
winners: trademark owners, copyright holders, and corporate repeat
players. The use of contract is already moving much of this dispute
resolution out of the courtroom. We are not far from a time when
technology makes it possible to move it out of the human realm.
21 Id. at 2-3. Note that this legal environment should be "based on a decentralized,
contractual model of law rather than one based on top-down regulation." Id.
Id. at 6.
A. Michael Froomkin, Of Governments and Governance, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617,
620 (1999).
21 The Report tacitly assumes that technology is incapable of doing harm.
Lemley, supra note 14, at 1259 ("[Tihe common goal of these quasi-private ordering
advocates is to decentralize governance and return control to the people-at least, the
people who write the contracts.").
[Vol. 34:151
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II. FOUR WORLDS OF PRIVATIZED DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Domain Name Disputes
1. The Problem
On the Internet, a system called "domain names" is used to locate
people and organizations. Domain names translate the long strings of
numbers that computers use to send data from one computer to another
into words that are easier for humans to use.26 For example, the domain
name www.amazon.com locates an Internet site for Amazon.com, Inc. at
Internet address 208.216.182.15 and a particular host server named
"www." The "coin" part of the domain name reflects the purpose of the
organization (in this example, "commercial") and is called the top-level
domain name.27 The "amazon" part of the domain name defines the
organization or entity and together with the ".com" is called the second-
level domain name.
These second-level domain names must be unique on the Internet;
there can be no more than one amazon.com. That was no problem in the
early days of a small number of largely academic and governmental
users. It poses a huge problem now, with businesses all over the world
scrambling to acquire the second-level domain name that the public
associates with their business and to wrest those domain names from
people who first registered them.2s According to Professor Jonathan
Zittrain, "Major trademark holders, somewhat late to the Internet
6 For a more complete and technical explanation of domain names, Internet protocol
(IP), transmission control protocol (TCP), and the domain name system, see Whatis, at
http://www.whatis.com (last modified Mar. 23, 2000). See also Jon Postel, Information
Science Institute, Domain Name System Structure and Delegation, Request for Comments: 1591,
at http://info.internet.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc/files/rfc1591.txt (Mar. 1994).
' Although there are about 260 approved top-level domains, most of them are country
codes (ccTLDs). There are seven "generic" top-level domains (gTLDs), but the three most
popular are .com, .net, and .org. This popularity stems in part from the fact that the early
search engines only indexed these three domains. Diane Cabell, Name Conflicts, Top Level
Domains, Learning Cyberlaw in Cyberspace, at http://www.cyberspacelaw.org/cabell
/index.html (last modified Aug. 25, 1999). ICANN has recently adopted a tentative plan to
create additional top-level domain names.
' The uniqueness of second-level domain names means that domain name holders
will have broader rights than those granted by trademark law, where multiple companies
can have the same trademark so long as there is no danger of confusion. For example,
"Amazon" could be a travel company in Texas, a women's health club in Massachusetts,
and a book store in California, all without infringing each other's rights. The Internet
allows no such flexibility at present.
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themselves, found their marks already registered when they attempted
to take up shop online." 29 Many were registered by individuals or small
businesses who intended to use the name. In addition, a new type of
entrepreneur, called a "cybersquatter," made a business out of
registering well known domain names for the purpose of selling them
back to the trademark owner at inflated prices. The price reflected both
the trademark owner's strong desire to use its name as a domain name
and the probable cost of litigation to acquire the domain name.
2. The System
The Internet's domain name system is currently (since 1998)
administered by ICANN, a private not-for-profit corporation, under the
authority of a series of understandings with the U.S. Department of
Commerce. One of its first charges was to create a dispute resolution
policy to allow cheap, fast resolution of conflicts regarding rights to
domain names. ICANN approved its Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy 32 and Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy33 on October 24, 1999, and they went into effect on
December 1, 1999. ICANN imposes this policy on all approved
Registrars, and through them onto all who acquire domain names.
' Jonathan Zittrain, ICANN: Between the Public and the Private- Comments Before
Congress, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1071, 1079 (1999). Domain registration is done on a first-
come, first-served basis.
Whatis, Cybersquatting, at http://www.whatis.com (last modified, Oct. 13, 2000).
31 See ICANN, Approved Agreements among ICANN, the U.S. Department of Commerce,
and Network Solutions, Inc., at http://www.icann.org/nsi/nsi-agreements.htm (Nov. 10,
1999). ICANN is pronounced EYE-can, as in "I can at least try to manage the Internet."
Whatis, ICANN, at http://www.whatis.com (last modified Mar. 16, 2000). In a sense,
ICANN is the successor to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (LANA), which in
turn derived its authority under a contract from the U.S. government which financed the
original research network, ARPANET, from which the Internet grew. The need to
internationalize the governing of the Internet led the U.S. government to recommend the
origin of ICANN as a global, non-government entity. Id. For a fuller (and more gossipy)
account of the transfer of authority to ICANN, see Laura Pearlman, Truth, Justice and the
Dot-Com Wars, LAW NEWS NETWORK, at http://www.lawnewsnetwork.com/practice
/techlaw/news/A20216-2000Mar3l.html (Mar. 31, 2000).
- ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (Aug. 26, 1999) [hereinafter ICANN
Policy].
ICANN, Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm (Aug. 26, 1999) [hereinafter ICANN
Rules].
, Registrars are companies, licensed by ICANN, that have the power to assign new
domain names. Registrars must be accredited by ICANN, and they must agree to abide by
[Vol. 34:151
Going Private
The ICANN policy allows a trademark holder who alleges that a
domain name infringes on its mark to submit a complaint to any dispute
resolution provider (DRP) approved by ICANN. The complainant
must allege and convince the arbitrator that:
1. the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the
complainant's trademark or service mark; and
2. the domain name holder has no rights or legitimate interests in
the domain name; and
3. the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad
faith. 
6
The Policy also provides a non-exhaustive list of circumstances that
are "evidence" of bad faith:
1. the domain name holder registered or acquired the domain name
primarily for the purpose of selling it to the owner of the trademark
or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable
consideration in excess of documented out-of-pocket costs; or
2. the domain name was registered in order to prevent the owner of
the trademark or service mark from using its mark in a domain
name, provided that the domain name holder has engaged in a
pattern of such conduct; or
3. the domain name was registered primarily for the purpose of
disrupting the business of a competitor; or
4. by using the domain name, the owner has intentionally
attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its Web
site, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source,
ICANN's rules. See ICANN, Registrar Accredidation: Process, http://www.icann.org
/registrars/accreditation-process.htm (last modified June 22, 2000). ICANN's rules require
the registrars to incorporate the UDRP into the registration agreements between the
registrar and the domain name holders. Paragraph 1 of the ICANN Policy informs domain
name holders that the dispute resolution policy is "incorporated by reference into your
Registration Agreement." ICANN Policy, supra note 32, § 1.
' There are currently four approved DRPs: 1) World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO); 2) The National Arbitration Forum (NAF); 3) eResolution (eRes); and
4) CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution (CPR). See ICANN, Approved Providers for Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/approved-
providers.htm (last modified Oct. 17, 2000).
' ICANN Policy, supra note 32, § 4(a).
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sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of its Web site or of a
product or service on its Web site.37
The domain name holder (the "respondent" under the ICANN policy)
has three possible affirmative defenses (note, however, that their
elements overlap considerably with the complainant's burden of proof):
1. before any notice of the dispute, the domain name holder used,
or made demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a
name corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona
fide offer of goods or services; or
2. the domain name holder has been commonly known by the
domain name (even absent a trademark or service mark); or
3. the domain name holder is making a legitimate noncommercial
or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain
to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or
service mark at issue.3
These standards, then, involve the resolution of fact-intensive issues
such as confusing similarity, bad faith, the intent behind registration, fair
use, and whether conduct would tarnish a trademark or service mark.
You might expect the resolution of such disputes to involve procedural
devices such as discovery or live hearings or cross examination. You
would be wrong. Rather, the main point of this policy is that it is fast
and cheap.39 The complaint is filed4° in writing, and it must describe the
manner in which the domain name is similar to the trademark, why the
Id. § 4(b).
Id. § 4(c). The ICANN Policy is similar to U.S. law, but it is not in fact the same as
the law of any actual country. For example, compare the Policy to the recently-enacted
Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West Supp.
2000) (section 43(d) of the Lanham Act). See Emerson H. Tiller, ICANN's Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy: An Overview and Critique, 1 INTERNET L. & BUS. 589, 591-93
(2000) (explaining requirements of each affirmative defense).
Tiller, supra note 38, at 589.
Just as a plaintiff in litigation could choose the forum (within limits), the
complainant here can choose any of the approved dispute resolution providers. ICANN
Policy, supra note 32, § 4(d). While it is somewhat too early to draw conclusions, it appears
that the different providers have statistically stronger and weaker tendencies to rule in
favor of the trademark owner. As of late summer 2000, WIPO has ruled for the trademark
holder more than 80% of the time, while eResolution has done so about 55% of the time.
The complainants seem to have noticed. While WIPO got 29% of the complaints filed in
January, 2000, it got 61% of the complaints filed in July, 2000. See Michael Geist, WIPO




domain name holder has no rights in it, and why the domain name
should be considered as having been registered and used in bad faith.
The complaining trademark owner must also attach documentary or
other evidence, including the trademark or service mark registration.4'
The complainant pays the filing fee.4 Since this complaint will, in effect,
form the basis for the decision, it will probably contain more factual
detail than "notice pleading" would require.43
The domain name holder/respondent must be notified within three
calendar days" and has twenty days from the commencement of the
proceeding to submit a response. That response must address
specifically the statements in the complaint as well as any applicable
affirmative defenses." If the respondent wants a three-member panel
rather than a single arbitrator, it must pay half of the applicable fee.47 If
the respondent fails to respond, the case will be decided based on the
complaint." The arbitrator has the power to determine the admissibility,
41 The DRP is allowed to impose page or word limits on the complaint, response, and
opinion. ICANN Rules, supra note 33, §§ 3, 5.
2 ICANN Policy, supra note 32, § 4(g); ICANN Rules, supra note 33, § 19(a).
' The legal fees involved would likely be more than required for merely drafting a
court complaint, but far less than would be required to litigate a preliminary injunction
request. It is possible, therefore, that a trademark owner who expects the domain name
holder to default would actually be better off filing a lawsuit in federal court, where the
filing fees would be less than $750. Both filing fees and the cost of preparing the initial
document will be lower in federal court. The Eastern District of Virginia, the federal
district in which Network Solutions, Inc. is located, has held that the act of registering the
domain name is a sufficient basis for specific personal jurisdiction there in a suit under
section 1125(d) of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)
(West Supp. 2000). See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 9 F. Supp. 2d 528, 534 (E.D.
Va. 2000). But see Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848 (E.D. Va. 2000) (granting
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction). Even if the defendant
unexpectedly answers, the Eastern District is the home of the "rocket docket" which
emphasizes limited discovery and early trial settings. The ACPA also has an in rem
provision which has been upheld by some courts. See, e.g., Heathmount A.E. Corp. v.
Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Va. 2000); BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v.
Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
" ICANN Rules, supra note 33, § 4(a).
Id. § 5(a).
I Id. § 5(b)(i).
,r The fees vary by provider, and vary according to the number of domain names in
dispute, but the total fee for multiple panelists would be between $2,000 and $4,000 for
most cases. See, e.g., CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, CPR's Supplemental Rules and Fee
Schedule, http://www.cpradr.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2000); eResolution, Schedule of Fees,
http://www.eresolution.ca/services/dnd/schedule.htm (last modified Oct. 2, 2000);
National Arbitration Forum, Schedule of Fees, http://arbforum.com/domains (last visited
Nov. 21, 2000).
, Recent decisions have indicated that the failure to respond is proof of bad faith. See,
e.g., AFC Enters. V. Max Mktg., Case No. D2000-0975 (WIPO Oct. 12, 2000),
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relevance, materiality, and weight of the evidence, and may request
further statements and documents from the parties.49 The ICANN Rules
provide that there "shall be no in-person hearings (including hearings by
teleconference, videoconference, and Web conference)" unless the
arbitrator "determines, in its sole discretion and as an exceptional matter,
that such a hearing is necessary for deciding the complaint." 50 They
direct the arbitrator to forward his decision on the complaint to the DRP
within fourteen days of his appointment.5 ' The decision is supxosed to
be in writing and provide the reasons on which it is based. If the
arbitrator rules for the complainant, ICANN will require the cancellation
of the domain name or its transfer to the complainant.5' The only way
for the domain name holder to prevent the cancellation or transfer is to
file a lawsuit against the trademark owner and provide a fie-stamped
copy of the complaint to ICANN within ten business days. 54 Thus, the
whole process should thus be resolved in less than two months.
The original purpose for the ICANN dispute resolution process was to
create a remedy for a narrowly defined group of particularly egregious
cases. During the initial drafting process, the procedure was said to be
available "only in respect of deliberate, bad faith, abusive, domain name
registrations or 'cybersquatting." ICANN's staff repeated this promise
after receiving public comments on the proposed policy. They assured
concerned commentators that "the policy... calls for administrative
resolution for only a small, special class of disputes," namely those
"involving 'abusive registrations' made with bad faith intent to profit
commercially from others' trademarks."m
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-O975.html; Mars, Inc. v. Vanilla,
Ltd., Case No. D2000-0586 (WIPO Sept. 1, 2000), http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains
/decisions/html/d2000-O586.html; Ty, Inc. v. O.Z. Names, Case No. D2000-0370 (WIPO
June 27, 2000), http:/ /arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-0370.html; Suntex
Int'l, Inc. v. 24game, Case No. D2000-0408 (WIPO June 26, 2000), http://arbiter.wipo.int
/domains/decisions/html/d2000-0408.html.
" ICANN Rules, supra note 33, § 10(d).
Id. § 13.
Id. § 15(b).
- Id. § 15(d).
" ICANN Policy, supra note 32, § 3. There are no provisions for money damages. Id.
' Id. § 4(k). The lawsuit must be filed in a "mutual jurisdiction," which will generally
be either the location of the domain name registrar's principal office or the domain name
holder's residence as shown in the registrar's Whois database at the time the complaint is
fied. Id.
" WIPO, Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process § 135(i) (Apr. 30, 1999),
http://wipo2.wipo.int/processl/report/finalreport.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2000).
1 Anonymous, Does the UDRP Provide for Constructive Notice of Trademarks?, 1
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Nevertheless, the dispute resolution procedure has been used in all
sorts of trademark/domain name disputes and even disputes involving
un-trademarked famous names. Between December 1, 1999 and July 31,
2000, 1330 new complaints were filed, involving 2252 domain names.57
Of the 1193 domain names disposed of by decision, only about 19% were
decided in favor of the domain name holder. The rest resulted in
transferring the domain name to the trademark owner (900), canceling
the domain name (14), both canceling and transferring challenged names
(4), or in a split decision (44). 8
The ICANN process is mandatory in the sense that once a complaint is
filed it will be processed by the dispute resolution provider unless the
complaint is settled or withdrawn. If the domain name holder does not
respond, it will almost certainly lose, and ICANN will order its domain
name transferred or canceled. It is not mandatory in the sense that the
ICANN rules do not preclude the filing of a lawsuit, either during the
proceeding or after its conclusion." A trademark owner who believes
that, given its particular circumstances, a federal lawsuit would be more
advantageous is free to pursue that option instead of, or in addition to,
the ICANN procedure. 6
3. ICANN Scenarios
The year is 1995. Imagine four possible dot-corns: 1) Caleb South
registers the domain name delta.com to display pictures and news about
his new baby girl, Delta;" or 2) Delta Fishing Trips, a new company that
INTERNET L. & Bus. 584, 586 (2000), (quoting ICANN, Second Staff Report on Implementation
Documents for the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy § 4.1(c), at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct99.htm (Oct. 25, 1999)).
17 ICANN, Statistical Summary of Proceedings Under Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, http://www.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (last visited Nov. 21,
2000) [hereinafter ICANN Statistics] (providing daily-updated summary of status of
proceedings).
5 Cf. ICANN Statistics, supra note 57 (displaying updated numbers).
ICANN Policy, supra note 32, at § 4(k). The arbitrator has the discretion to stay the
ICANN proceeding (or not) during the pendency of court litigation. ICANN Rules, supra
note 33, § 18(a). It is unsettled at this time whether ICANN decisions will be entitled to
some degree of deference in any related litigation. See, e.g., Weber-Stephen Prods. Co. v.
Armitage Hardware & Bldg. Supply, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1766 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Weber-
Stephen Prods. v. Armitage Hardware, Case No. D2000-0187 (WIPO May 11, 2000),
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-O187.html.
" ICANN Policy, supra note 32, § 4(k).
61 Cf. Karen Kaplan, What's in a Name? A Legal Tangle for a Little Girl, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
18,1999, available at http://www.wcbcourses.com/wcb/schools/LEXIS/lawO7/llew
/2/files/veronicadomainname.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2000).
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plans to organize fishing trips in the Louisiana bayous registers the
domain name delta.com in order to advertise its services to tourists
visiting the area;62 or 3) the Association of Unhappy Travelers registers
the domain name delta.com for the purpose of satirizing Delta Airlines;63
or 4) Dave Smith registers delta.com for the purpose of selling it to some
"delta" based business, who will want that domain name when they
wake up to the commercial possibilities of online advertising or sales.6
Now it's the year 2000. Delta Airlines wants to start its own Web site
and wants the domain name most customers will try first, delta.com.6
Imagine that Delta Airlines files a complaint under the ICANN
procedure against any of the four hypothetical domain name registrants.
Delta Airlines will choose the DRP and file a complaint that includes the
required information.
Caleb South, who cannot afford to hire a lawyer to defend his baby's
Web site, and who is intimidated by the prospect of a legal dispute with
a big company, defaults. ICANN will order his Web site transferred to
Delta Airlines.66 Delta Fishing Trips likewise cannot afford a lawyer. Its
62 See 3636275 Canada v. eResolution.com, Case No. D2000-0110 (WIPO Apr. 10, 2000),
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-O110.html (finding both no
legitimate interest and bad faith registration even though domain name was registered
prior to existence of complainant, which was doing business as eResolution); cf. Rockport
Boat Line (1994) Ltd. v. Gananoque Boat Line Ltd., File No. FA00040000094653 (NAF May
10, 2000), http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/94653.htm (finding no evidence
of bad faith where Gananoque Boat Line registered domain rockportboatline.com, despite
fact that Rockport Boat Line operated business under that name out of Rockport, Ontario,
and Gananoque is competitor that does not operate out of Rockport). See generally Lisa
Naylor, Individuals Getting Wiped Out by WIPO, THE STANDARD, Sept. 5, 2000,
http://www.thestandard.net/article/display/0,1151,18239.00.html (discussing award to
complainants of lemond.com and barcelona.com).
6 Cf. Compagnie de Saint Gobain v. Coin-Union Corp., Case No. D2000-0020 (WIPO
Mar. 14, 2000), http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-OO20.html
(noting that respondent who registered domain name for use in conjunction with web site
on which shareholders of complainant could exchange views did not have rights or
legitimate interest in respect of domain name).
" Cf. Hearst Communications, Inc. v. Spencer, File No. FA0093763 (NAF Apr. 13,
2000), http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/93763.htm (finding esquire.com
not generic in holding that mark of David Spencer, doing business as Mail.com, Inc., was
both confusingly similar and registered in bad faith).
' In fact, delta.com is registered by Delta Funding Company of Woodbury, NY. For
an explanation of why a commercial enterprise wants the domain name associated with its
trademark, see Carl Oppedahl, Analysis and Suggestions Regarding NSI Domain Name
Trademark Dispute Policy, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73, 77-81 (1996). The
real Delta Airlines home page is located at www.delta-air.com.
Ironically, then, the domain name holder who probably has the best claim to good




owner files a response claiming that it really intends to start a company
with the Delta name, and has begun to do so, but that argument is
rejected by the arbitrator who orders the domain name transferred to
Delta Airlines. Delta Fishing Trips also cannot afford the legal fees to file
suit to prevent the transfer. The Association of Unhappy Travelers files a
response claiming non-commercial fair use, loses, and likewise is
unwilling to spend its resources in major litigation against a multi-
national corporation.67 Dave Smith, whose business revolves around
registering generic "dictionary word" domain names and offering them
for sale to the general public, hires a lawyer and responds, and spends
the money to request a three-arbitrator panel. He loses the ICANN
proceeding. Since delta.com is just one of Dave's many domain names
for sale, he writes it off as a loss and also chooses not to file a lawsuit.6&
In each hypothetical case, the trademark owner achieved its goal: fast,
comparatively inexpensive transfer of the domain name. The decisions
may or may not be "correct" applications of ICANN's Policy, but they
were rendered quickly and they are in effect final.
As technology develops, this process may become automated,
rendering even faster and less expensive dispute resolution. Trademark
owners could develop software to search out domain names that they
deem confusingly similar to their trademark. The software could then
automatically generate a cease and desist letter, which it could send by e-
mail to the domain name owner identified in the Registrar's "whois"
database.69 If the domain name is not transferred or canceled within a
short period of time, the computer could generate an automated
Complaint, which it could file with the company's favored DRP. The
DRPs could also automate the decision making process. Most fact
67 Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Walsucks, Case No. D2000-0477 (WIPO July 20, 2000),
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/htm1/d2000-O477.html (holding that
several "Wal-Mart sucks" domains constituted extortion and not free speech).
' Cf. J. Crew Int'l, Inc. v. crew.com, Case No. D2000-0054 (WIPO Apr. 20, 2000),
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/htm/d2000-OO54.html (holding that
repondent was domain name speculator who both had no legitimate interest in "crew.com"
and registered domain name in bad faith).
' Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), the original private Registrar, allows a search of its
database from its website, which will lead the researcher to information about the name
and contact information for the domain name owner. See Network Solutions, Whois Lookup,
at http://www.networksolutions.com/cgi-bin/whois/whois (last visited Sept. 30, 2000).
Actually, if the process becomes automated it should no longer be necessary to have
DRPs; the computer that decides the case could be centralized at ICANN and a single
program used to resolve the cases. While we tolerate different humans making different
decisions on the same facts, it seems unlikely that we would tolerate computers with
different programming making different decisions on the same facts.
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patterns will become so routine as ICANN builds its database of ICANN
decisions (they are, after all, based on paper allegations) that no human
arbitrators would be required: an algorithm could resolve the dispute.
This would not even take the fourteen days currently allotted for
decision. The DRP's computer could notify both parties and ICANN of
the result by e-mail. If the trademark owner prevails and the ICANN
computer doesn't receive notice that the domain name owner files a
lawsuit within ten days, ICANN's computer could automatically order
the relevant Registrar to cancel or transfer the domain name to the
complainant. Fanciful? Maybe. It would require a complex and
sophisticated program. A human might at least be required to examine
the supporting documentation to see if it is consistent with the parties'
allegations. 71 Greater automation and speed, however, are sufficiently
prized that there would be incentive to design such a program, and
generous rewards for its designer.72
B. Notice and Take-Down of Web Sites under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act73
1. The Problem
The purpose of copyright law is to give authors an incentive to create
and distribute new works.74  Without such protection, it is feared,
authors would not be adequately compensated and would not, therefore,
The current ICANN Rules require both complainant and respondent to include a
statement that "the information contained.., is to the best of [the filer's] knowledge
complete and accurate, that [the pleading] is not being presented for any improper
purpose, such as to harass, and that the assertions... are warranted under these Rules and
under applicable law, as it now exists or as it may be extended by a good-faith and
reasonable argument." ICANN Rules, supra note 33, §§ 3(b)(xiv), 5(b)(viii), 15(d). These
provisions appear to be modeled after Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
There is, however, no sanction available against a party who falsely makes these
statements.
' Compare the kind of programming required for domain name decisions, which
require information about events happening outside the computers themselves, with the
kind of programming required for digital rights management technology, discussed in Part
I.C, infra.
7' This section of the article focuses on Title II of the DMCA, known as the Online
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, codified at 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West Supp.
2000), and in particular on the notice and take-down provisions of § 512(c).
7' See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). See
also William Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STuD. 325, 326 (1989) ("Striking the correct balance between access and incentives is
the central problem of copyright law.").
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create. The incentive to create serves the broader public purpose of
providing public access to a larger body of material. However, as
Professor Matt Jackson notes, too much copyright protection is
counterproductive, "The paradox for policymakers is that as the author's
control over the work is increased, public access is decreased - and
public access is why the author is being given an incentive to create in
the first place." 75 Copyright law thus involves a balancing of interests
between the needs of authors and the needs of the public. Because of
these public interests, the rights of copyright holders are not absolute.
For example, the doctrine of "fair use" gives individuals power to use
limited portions of a copyrighted work to further education or debate on
the topic.76 Also, the buyer of copyrighted works (at least in traditional
media) acquires "first sale" rights, allowing her to dispose of the
purchased copy as she sees fit She can keep it, loan it out, or give it
77
away.
Improvements in technology have often been seen as a threat to
copyright owners.78 The Internet poses a new threat to copyright owners
for at least two reasons. First, digital technology has both reduced the
cost and increased the quality of copies of copyrighted material. An
infinite number of almost perfect copies can be made for almost no cost.79
More importantly, the Internet allows multi-directional communication;
people with digital copies of copyrighted works can share their copies
with a huge number of other users. Instead of worrying about one
record purchaser making one audiotape copy of music for a friend,
copyright holders are worried about Web sites making free,
unauthorized copies of copyrighted material available to literally
millions of Internet users.so
' Matt Jackson, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: A Proposed Amendment to
Accommodate Free Speech, 5 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 61, 64 (2000).
76 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (providing that criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, and research, are not
infringements of copyright).
- 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984)
(holding that sale of home videotape recorders did not constitute contributory
infringement of television program copyrights).
' Jackson, supra note 75, at 66-67 (noting that "digital ones and zeros can be
reproduced effortlessly and perfectly").
John Markoff, The Concept of Copyright Fights for Internet Survival, N.Y. TIMES, May
10, 2000, available at http:/ /www.nytimes.com/ library/tech/0O / 05 /biztech /articles
/10digital.html (describing creation of Freenet program that will make it possible to find
and acquire files without reference to central database, providing no single target for
aggrieved copyright holders).
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2. The Statute
Internet technology, then, has led to widespread fear among copyright
owners that the value of their copyright has been dramatically
decreased. As a result of this concern, Congress passed the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA). Title II of the act, called the
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, creates a safe
harbor, from liability for vicarious or contributory infringement, for an
Internet service provider (ISP) who takes down Web pages alleged to
infringe anyone's copyright." These mechanisms are often referred to as
the "notice and take-down" provisions of the DMCA. The DMCA
targets the ISPs rather than the individual users, probably for strategic
reasons; it is much easier to locate and motivate one large corporation
with a fixed location than one thousand individual infringers with
anonymous screen names. Further, the safe harbor provisions of the
statute represent a compromise between "copyright owners, who
wanted to impose strict liability on computer networks in order to
maintain complete control over their content," and network operators,
who wanted complete immunity from liability for vicarious or
contributory infringement.s2
Under the DMCA safe harbor provisions, an ISP that is providing
storage space for its users (hosting user Web pages) is not liable to the
copyright owner as long as it: 1) does not have constructive knowledge
that the material is infringing; 2) does not receive a direct financial
benefit from the infringing activity; and 3) follows the notice and take-
down procedures set out in the statute. The notice and take-down
procedures effectively require the ISP to remove alleged infringing
material from a Web site without any procedural safeguards for the Web
site owner and thus constitute privatized dispute resolution.3
" "Whatis" defines an Internet service provider (ISP) as a "company that provides
individuals and other companies access to the Internet and other related services such as
Web site building and virtual hosting. An ISP has the equipment and the
telecommunication line access required to have [points-of-presence] on the Internet for the
geographical area served." Whatis, Internet Service Provider, at http://www.whatis.com
(last visited June 22, 2000). ISPs are sometimes contrasted with "online service providers,"
who provide content as well as access (such as AOL), but the terms are sometimes used
interchangeably. The DMCA defines "service provider" as "a provider of online services
or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor," including "an entity offering the
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications,
between or among points specified by a user, for material of the user's choosing, without
modification to the content of the material as sent or received." 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(k) (West
Supp. 2000).
82 Jackson, supra note 75, at 72-73.
' The ISP must also have sent contact information to the copyright office in order to
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A copyright holder begins the process by notifying the ISP that works
are being infringed and identifying the allegedly infringing materials8 4
The notice must state under penalty of perjury that the party sending the
notice is authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner, but the
complaint itself need not be made under oath. When the ISP receives a
notification that substantially conforms to the statute's requirements, the
ISP must "expeditiously... remove, or disable access to, the material
that is claimed to be infringing." aS In other words, it must block access to
the accused Web site. The ISP must then notify the alleged infringer that
access to the allegedly infringing materials will be blocked permanently
unless the accused infringer submits a counter notice to the ISP
contesting the allegation of infringement. 8 If this happens, the ISP must
forward the counter notification to the copyright owner. It must also
wait ten business days (but not more than fourteen business days) and
87
restore access to the material . However, if within that time the
copyright owner notifies the ISP that the copyright owner has filed a
court action against the alleged infringer, the service provider is not
obligated to restore access to the work.8 As long as it follows this
procedure, the ISP is liable neither to the copyright owner for
infringement nor to the accused infringer for damages should it turn out
that the claim of infringement was erroneous.8 9 A rational ISP, then, will
always choose to take down the content when it receives a notice of
alleged infringement. The safe harbor provisions turn the ISP into the
copyright owner's enforcer, and the copyright owner often will not need
to file a legal proceeding, or even directly confront the alleged online
infringer.9°
From the standpoint of the copyright holder, this procedure is fast and
cheap. If the alleged infringer does not respond (whether because they
are infringing, don't know whether they're infringing, or don't want to
qualify for the safe harbor provisions. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512.
' Id. § 512(c)(3)(A).
' Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
' This counter notification must be made under penalty of perjury. Id. §
512(c)(3)(A)(vi). If the alleged infringer "knowingly materially misrepresents" the
substance of its counter notification, it may be liable for damages and attorneys' fees. Id. §
512(f).
u Id. § 512(g)(2)(C).
- Id. § 512(g)(2)(C). Note that the lawsuit need only be filed; the copyright holder does
not need to obtain a preliminary injunction ordering the site to be taken down. Id.
" Id. § 512(g)(1). In contrast, if the ISP does not expeditiously remove the challenged
content, it is potentially liable for damages for contributory infringement. Id. § 51 2 (g)(2).
" Jackson, supra note 75, at 81.
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fight an expensive battle), the copyright owner will have succeeded, by
destroying access to the material, almost immediately. The cost will be
limited to the cost of drafting a notice that need include only: 1) the
physical or electronic signature of the person authorized to act on behalf
of the copyright owner; 2) identification or a representative list of the
copyrighted works being infringed; 3) identification of the alleged
infringing materials; 4) contact information for the complaining party; 5)
a statement that the complaining party in good faith believes the
material to be infringing; and 6) a statement that the notification is
accurate and that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of
the copyright owner.9 Although a lawyer could be consulted in drafting
such a notice, it could be done by a non-lawyer quite easily.92 If the
alleged infringer files a counter notification, the cost will increase to
include the attorney fees required to file a lawsuit, but the lawsuit itself
93
will keep access to the site blocked. The copyright holder need not pay
its lawyers the legal fees and other costs required to prepare and present
a motion for preliminary injunction.
3. Notice and Take-Down Scenarios
Imagine two Web sites. One is maintained by Sarah Virtue, a former
member of the Church of Faith (CF) who is now one of its staunchest
critics.94 Virtue has devoted a portion of her Web site to debunking
claims and exposing what she sees as its weaknesses.95 Her Web site
includes portions of previously unpublished, copyrighted CF
documents. 96  Virtue's Internet service provider is Scientific
Networking.97 The other Web site belongs to Cases.com, a Web-based
resource for legal research.98  Cases.com's service is free; the founders
9' 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi).
' The tricky part, of course, is deciding whether the accused material really infringes
the copyright. But the complainant will not be liable to the accused infringer, even if the
material is not protected, unless it "knowingly materially misrepresents" the claim. Id. §
512(0.
" Id. § 512(g)(2)(C).
' Cf. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
0 Cf. id.
Cf. id. at 1365-66.
' Cf. id. at 1366 (holding that Internet access provider not directly liable for copies
made and stored on users' computers).
" Cf. T.R. Halvorson, Jurisline.com Suit Could Shift the Foundations of the Online Legal




believe that they can sustain the site through advertising revenue.99
Cases.com gets its data, in part, from LEXUS Legal CD-ROMs, using the
core text of court opinions from the LEXUS data after removing all
editorial enhancements. 10 LEXUS belongs to BelgianCo, Inc. 1
Cases.com's Web site is hosted by Lawnet.
Neither the Church of Faith nor BelgianCo is entranced by the two
hypothetical Web sites. CF files a notice with Scientific Networking,
alleging that Virtue's material is infringing. BelgianCo files a notice with
Lawnet that Cases.com's material is infringing. Both ISPs must block
access to the offending sites expeditiously or face potential liability for
• •102
copyright infringement. As long as they notify Virtue and Cases.corn
as required under the DMCA, neither ISP is liable to its customers for
damages.' Virtue gives up, not wanting to deal with what she knows to
be the tenacious litigiousness of CF. Cases.com files a counter
notification claiming that reported cases are government works and not
copyrightable and expects access to its site restored after ten days.
However, BelgianCo, to whom this matter is immensely important, files
suit within ten days and the challenged portions of Cases.com's site stay
down until that litigation is completed. Soon, Cases.com settles the case
because the start-up company cannot afford the cost of the litigation and
needs to get its site back up and running. °4 In both cases, the DMCA
notice and take down provisions compelled the outcome of the dispute




, See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c)(1) (West Supp. 2000).
1"3 See id. § 512(g)(1).
1" Cf. Jurisline.com, Jurisline.com Ends Litigation with Reed Elsevier and Matthew Bender
(June 20, 2000), available at http://www.jurisline.com/templates
//pressreleases.cfm?release=prO00620 (last visited Nov. 25, 2000) (discussing settlement
agreement).
10 Another phenomenon that raises similar issues are accusations of Internet
defamation. In countries that lack the more expansive American first amendment speech
protections, ISPs have been taking down web sites at the mere allegation of defamation.
See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham, Web site takes fight to Europe, FIN. TiMES, Apr. 13, 2000,
http:/ /news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=FT3ZE77UO7C&liv
(reporting that three web sites closed within two weeks following ISP's agreement to pay
more than £200,000 to settle libel action over material posted on one of its news groups).
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C. Trusted Systems and Digital Rights Management Technology
1. The Problem and the Technology
The problem here is much like the problem discussed above:
intellectual property owners fear that they are losing control over the
distribution of their content. The procedures created by the DMCA are
faster and cheaper than conventional litigation; they may be extremely
fast and cheap when the opponent has modest resources. Nevertheless,
the disputes can be protracted and expensive, and the interim losses
great, if a person insists on litigating her competing rights to the relevant
intellectual property. There are also certain kinds of Internet copyright
disputes not governed by the take-down provisions of the DMCA.10 As
a result, companies are integrating protective software into copyrighted
material such as digital copies of books, music, video, and computer
programs distributed over the Internet.' 7 Such "trusted systems" allow
the copyright holder to precisely restrict use of the material and
automatically enforce those restrictions. This software assures that
music, videos, documents, and programs can be stored and used only by
the buyer, and only in the ways authorized by the copyright holder.'08
Such "trusted systems" (also called "digital rights management
systems") turn the threat of digital technology into an opportunity for
copyright owners not only to protect iglts under existing law but also
quietly to attain a number of new ones.
Trusted systems are attached to the digital copies of the work, and
they ensure that copyright holders can track every use made of the
digital copies, trace where every copy resides on a network, and
" For example, current controversies over use of the Internet to share copyrighted
works such as music, movies, and cross-stitch patterns without the permission of the
copyright holder are not solved by notice and take down of an alleged offender's Web site.
" Actually, this software will also be included in media sold in traditional stores, but
this article will focus on its Internet implications.
,"' See, e.g., Lawrence M. Fisher, Xerox and Microsoft Create Digital Safeguard Company,
N.Y. TnMEs, Apr. 28, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/04
/biztech/articles/28xerox.html (reporting that Xerox Palo Alto Research Center and
Microsoft teaming up to form ContentGuard, Inc., which already has partnerships with
companies including Adobe Systems and Hewlett-Packard). It has also been reported that
Microsoft intends to deploy trusted systems software with an upcoming version of
Windows. Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-
Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 553 n.181 (1999).
10 Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134, available at




determine what is being done with the work at any given time."°
Trusted systems also "have the ability to secretly report back to the
copyright owner via the network on what the user was doing with the
work, and the ability to search the consumer's hard disk and report back
on what else was there.""' If an unlicensed use is detected, the system
112
can disable the product from working at all.
Trusted systems, then, "delegate enforcement and control to
computers"" and create a self-enforcing digital contract. Consumers
have no way to disregard the digital contract: the software simply will
not make an unauthorized copy, or any other act not allowed by the
trusted system software. Whatever terms are in the contract are
automatically enforced. Consider the following clause, which is already
in the cickwrap for RealNetworks, Inc:
The Software may include third party [Digital Rights Management
Systems (DRMs)] as Plug-in components... DRMs are designed to
manage and enforce intellectual property rights in digital content
purchased over the Internet. You may not take any action to
circumvent or defeat the security or content usage rules provided or
i" Trusted systems, from a technical standpoint, are just a pieces of software or
hardware that "can be relied on to follow certain rules." Mark Stefik, Trusted Systems, SCI.
AM., Mar. 1997, at 78. They recognize "approved" customers and allow only authorized
users to access information or programs. Trusted systems, which use a kind of encryption
technology, are already common in computer networks that require security from
unauthorized would-be hackers.
In the context of copyright disputes, trusted systems work to prevent
purchasers/licensees from making unauthorized copies or using legally protected works.
Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1093
(1998); Samuelson, supra note 108, at 553 n.180. The systems works by attaching machine-
readable code to digital works. These codes allow the copyright holder to identify separate
possible uses of the work and control their use. For example, the Digital Property Rights
Language currently being developed by Xerox allows control of the user's right to play,
print, export, copy, transfer, loan, extract, edit, embed, backup, and restore digital works in
ways the user has not paid for, because the trusted system prevents the use. See Mark
Gimbel, Note, Some Thoughts on the Implications of Trusted Systems for Intellectual Property
Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1671, 1676-80 (1998) (explaining in detail rights involved and
operation of system).
Trusted systems can also take the form of disabling subprograms embedded in
licensed material. These subprograms can cause the software to cease operation if an
unauthorized use is detected. In addition, they can report back to the licensor over the
Internet so that the licensor can charge for or disable the use. Samuelson, supra note 108, at
543-44 n.136.
... See id. at 543 n.134.
.1. Samuelson, supra note 108, at 543 n.136.
113 Mark Stefik, The Bit and the Pendulum: Balancing the Interests of Stakeholders in Digital
Publishing, 16 COMPUTER LAW. 1, 4 (1997).
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enforced by either the DRM or the Software. DRMs may be able to
revoke your ability to use applicable content. [RealNetworks (RN)]
is not responsible for the operation of the DRM in any way,
including revocation of your content. RN is not responsible for any
communications to or from any third party DRM provider, or for
the collection or use of information by third party DRMs. You
consent to the communications enabled and /or performed by the
DRM, including automatic updating of the DRM without further
notice.
1 4
Trusted system enthusiasts note that they provide for greater control
than copyright law; the DRM, rather than copyright law, controls the use
of the product. For example, the creators of trusted systems anticipate
that fair use of copyrighted material must be purchased with a license.
So would first sale rights: the right to read, watch, or listen to a work
would be licensed separately from the right to read it again, copy it, print
it, or whatever. 1 7 So would the right to make a backup copy. Each use
would be licensed and charged an associated fee.
For procedural purposes, the point is that trusted systems constitute
automated self-help.1 ° They are not a dispute resolution system in the
traditional sense. Rather, this technology preempts the court system by
building its mechanism for asserting its claimed property rights into the
product itself. The copyright holder needs no recourse to the courts to
enforce its copyright - the copyright is self-enforcing. There will be no
"efficient breach" of a copyright license, because there can be no breach
at all. Because there will be no way to use breach to test purported
agreements, courts will not be examining the legality of the bargain.
114 This term popped up as paragraph 6 of the End User License Agreement associated
with a download of "free" beta software for RealNetworks version 8. Since it appeared as a
dialog box that the user had to click to accept or reject the terms, it had no associated URL,
nor could it be directly printed off the screen.
"' Id.; see also Radin & Wagner, supra note 15, at 1315 ("Trusted systems... can be
programmed ... to prevent all copying of a piece of content or the making of more than n
copies, ... to prevent reading it more than once or more than n times, to destroy the
content if the user attempts to do something prohibited, and so on. Many of the theories
for self-ordering in the information context - the shift from copyright to contract, for
example - rest on the assumption that all of the details of these contracts will be rendered
self-enforcing through the use of trusted systems.").
116 Stefik, supra note 113, at 10-12.
117 Id.
11 Id.
1 Id. Stefik also argues that such digital contracts should be enforceable even for
uncopyrightable works. Id. at 9.
'" Cohen, supra note 110, at 1089.
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This is a very efficient method of dispute resolution from the standpoint
of the copyright holder. From the standpoint of the consumer, it may
feel different:
[Trusted systems] are more like building high fences than relying on
nuisance law; more like moving out the tenant's furniture and
changing the lock than relying on landlord-tenant law; and more
like sending over a committee of one's friends to intimidate a
storekeeper into paying a debt than relying on legal enforcement of
contract.
At a minimum, the trusted system flips the parties' procedural posture.
Instead of the copyright holder suing to enjoin a breach and to collect
damages, the user who believes his rights were restricted by the trusted
system must bring a lawsuit to sue for damages for being denied what
he believes to be a legitimate use of the product. Since any individual
user's money damages may be fairly minimal, these lawsuits may never
materialize.'2
One might think that just as fast as engineers can design trusted
systems, other engineers can figure out how to disable them. The
government, however, has once again come to the rescue of the
copyright owners. The DMCA prohibits the circumvention of
technological protection measures, 123 and bans devices whose primary
purpose is to enable circumvention of technical protection systems. 4
There are serious criminal penalties for willfully violating the anti-
circumvention rules, 12 and it is not a defense that no act of underlying
infringement (e.g. illegal copying of a protected work) ever took place. I
Banning circumvention technologies while allowing digital rights
management technology "creates a sort of mandatory unilateral
disarmament in the technological arms race."' 27
121 Radin & Wagner, supra note 15, at 1315.
1 Since many of these contracts also include arbitration clauses, an unhappy user may
still be barred from a conventional court and from the use of a class action device. See
discussion infra Part I.D.1-2.
13 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West Supp. 2000).
124 Id. § 1201(a) (setting forth anti-circumvention rules). For an informative discussion
of one of the first cases brought under the anti-circumvention rules, see Amy Harmon, Free
Speech Rights for Computer Code?, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2000, available at
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/07/biztech/articles/31rite.html.
123 17 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(1) (mandating up to 5 years in jail and fine of up to $500,000 for
first offense).
124 Samuelson, supra note 108, at 556.
12 Lemley, supra note 14, at 1292 n.155. Critics of the anti-circumvention provisions
have asked the librarian of Congress to use a power granted under the DMCA to create
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2. Trusted System Scenarios
Rebecca Penny operates a small accounting business out of her home.
In order to help her with her clients' records, Penny purchases from
NetTax.com some tax accounting software. It is an expensive but very
helpful program, and she pays the "license fee" in monthly installments
of $50. On April 1, NetTax.com's accounting software erroneously
concludes that Penny's most recent payment is overdue. It contacts,
through the Internet, Penny's software and its digital rights management
system immediately disables the software. In so doing, it also deletes the
stored files containing Penny's clients' financial information. By the time
the misunderstanding is cleared up, tax day has come and gone and
Penny has lost several clients. The warranty disclaimer on which
Penny clicked before downloading the program eliminated all claims for
consequential damages, attorney's fees, and costs. It further requires
binding arbitration of any disputes between the user and NetTax.com.
Professor Plum teaches history at Western Methodist University. He
has paid for and downloaded a database containing copies of various
historical documents such as the Magna Carta, the Declaration of
Independence, and the United Nations Charter. He wants to copy parts
of those documents to his Web site for his class's use. When he tries to
do so, the database won't allow the digital copies to be made. In
response to his violation of the "terms and conditions" contained in the
software, a DRM disables his access to the database. Professor Plum
cannot afford to sue the seller/licensor and the dispute ends there.
Bill Daly buys a digital version of a book. He wants to make a copy of
one page to show his friend Gail Bridge, a teacher who is interested in
the subject. When he tries to print out a copy of that page, the trusted
system pops up a screen with some choices. For a fee, he can make a
hard copy of that page. If he agrees, the page as printed will contain a
machine-readable watermark. If Gail tries to make 20 copies of her copy
to pass out to her class, trusted digital photocopy systems will detect the
watermark and charge for the privilege of copying. Bill and Gail will
either pay these fees and achieve their desired uses, or they will choose
not to pay them and not make the copies. In either case, the book's
copyright holder need not file a lawsuit to prevent or collect damages for
rules that would protect fair use and free speech rights. Oscar S. Cisneros, Fear of a Pay-Per-
Use World, WIRED, Oct. 9, 2000, http:/ /www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,39330,00.html.
1" Compare the problem described in the Memorandum from Michele Kane, to
Raymond T. Nimmer regarding proposed UCC article 2B section 2B-712 (now UCITA) (Jan.
27, 1997), available at http://www.2bguide.com/docs/mkane.html.
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what it believes to be unauthorized use.129
D. Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Consumer Disputes
1. The Problem and the Law
In a perfect world, businesses would always sell products that
conformed to their descriptions and were free from defects. Further,
consumers would pay for those products promptly and reliably. Since
neither the Internet nor the physical world reaches such perfection,
disputes arise between merchants and consumers. The processing of
those disputes can be disruptive to businesses, distressing to the
consumer, and expensive for both. In the case of modestly-priced
consumer goods, the cost of resolving a dispute can easily exceed the
cost of the items themselves. It is therefore natural that businesses have
sought alternatives to conventional litigation for such matters. These
alternatives are imposed as conditions of the purchase contract. They
include choice of law clauses, choice of forum clauses, and (most
powerful of all) binding arbitration clauses.
The Internet is certainly not the only locus for such contracts in
consumer transactions. These clauses have, however, been embraced by
Internet businesses, and that should not be surprising.' 30 Some
commentators have suggested that Internet businesses are particularly
likely to adopt non-court methods of dispute resolution.13 The types of
pressures that lead merchants to impose clauses resolving uncertainty in
their favor are intensified on the Internet. 132 What are these pressures
19 Compare the proposal in Stefik, supra note 113, at 10.
' "ADR is also apt for disputes involving online commerce between geographically
disparate parties.... The availability of reliable dispute resolution can help Internet
commerce reach its full market potential." Developments in the Law--The Paths of Civil
Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1851, 1856 & n.38 (2000); see also Ron N. Dreben & Johanna L.
Werbach, Top 10 Things to Consider in Developing an Electronic Commerce Web Site, 16
COMPUTER LAW. 17, 18 (1999) (discussing likelihood that "clickwraps" and "terms and
conditions" limiting Web site operator's liability will be upheld as vaild).
13 See Martin C. Karamon, Note, ADR on the Internet, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 537,
537 (1996) (noting Internet technology's influence on increasing use of alternative dispute
resolution); Ethan Katsch, The New Frontier: Online ADR becoming a global priority, DisP.
REsOL. MAG., Winter 2000, at 6, 8 (warning that online alternative dispute resolution
should not replace face-to-face encounters); E. Casey Lide, Note & Comment, ADR and
Cyberspace: The Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Online Commerce, Intellectual Property
and Defamation, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. REsOL. 193, 216-22 (1996) (asserting that rapid
technological growth compels use of non-court methods).
' See Jody Storm Gale, Note, Service Over the "Net": Principles of Contract Law in
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that lead Internet businesses to include choice of law, choice of forum,
and binding arbitration clauses?
One source of uncertainty is the difficulty of predicting the applicable
law. Because of the global nature of the World Wide Web, goods sold
online tend to be offered to potential customers in all states and all
countries. It may be possible to determine the applicable law in some of
these locations, but learning and complying with the law of all possible
consumers is an overwhelming task. Further, the choice of law task is
complicated by the difficulty of knowing where the contract was made
and, sometimes, knowing the identity and location of the contracting
parties.
A company wishing to sell over the Internet could respond in a
number of ways. It could attempt to comply with the law of all possibly
applicable jurisdictions. It could attempt to subdivide its Web site so
that customers from certain states or countries purchase only from the
portion of the Web site designed to meet the requirements of the law of
their domicile.lu3 A more common response is to try to control this
variable by incorporating a choice of law clause into the contract. These
are generally enforceable, at least in U.S. courts, as long as the law
chosen has a reasonable relationship to the parties or the transaction and
the law chosen is not contrary to the fundamental public policy of a
significantly more interested state. M  There is therefore a strong
temptation for Internet businesses to adopt a choice of law clause.
Should a dispute arise, it is also difficult for an Internet business to
predict the location of the forum. Bricks and mortar businesses at least
know where, in physical space, the product in question was sold. While
not inevitably true, physical world consumers are apt to file suit in the
state in which they live and in which the seller has a physical sales
location. Internet businesses, on the other hand, connect with the
purchaser only through the electronic impulses of cyberspace. If the
product is downloaded directly by the consumer, the seller will lack
even a shipping address.1 3 The buyer may be anywhere in the United
Conflict, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 567 (1999) (discussing unique nature of Internet service
contracts).
3 Since potential customers could probably access any part of the web site, however, it
could become a serious marketing problem if consumers were to realize that their
counterparts in other countries received a significantly better deal than the one available to
them.
134 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLIcr OF LAWS § 187 (Supp. 1988).
13. The Internet seller will, presumably, have access to the buyer's credit card billing
address. There will also be identifying information associated with the buyer's computer,
although that computer may have been relocated in physical space since it was originally
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States or even in another country. Businesses would prefer not to find
themselves defending a consumer lawsuit in a distant location, be it
California, Germany, or Singapore. A company selling over the Internet
may respond to this concern by including a contractual choice of forum
clause: a term in the sales agreement limiting litigation of any dispute to
the courts of a particular jurisdiction (e.g. "King County,
Washington").'3 These are generally enforced, even when the clause
"looks like, acts like, and is, part of an adhesive consumer contract."
37
Merchants have a strong incentive to pre-select a privatized decision
maker to enforce the "law" as specified in the contract.'m To this end,
they can include an arbitration clause specifying the arbitral body, the
location of the arbitration, the substantive and procedural law to be
applied (or creating its own "law"), and the grounds, if any, for appeal.39
Two developments' 40 have made mandatory arbitration clauses
acquired. Where physical products are delivered to the consumer, the seller's uncertainty
is greatly decreased, although it may still prefer to include a clause requiring that any
litigation be had in a convenient and sympathetic forum.
" In addition to decreasing uncertainty, a forum may be chosen because it is likely to
enforce the choice of law, choice of forum, and arbitration clauses.
" Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and
Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 27 TEx. INT'L L.J. 323, 325 (1992), citing Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). Even a consumer who finds and reads the choice of
law and choice of forum clauses may not appreciate their significance. The effects of such
clauses are "more visible and important to 'repeat players' positioned to insist on
standardized provisions than they are to 'one-shot players' with whom they contract." Ex
ante, then, a repeat player values more highly a favorable dispute resolution clause. Paul
D. Carrington, Regulating Dispute Resolution Provisions in Adhesion Contracts, 35 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 225, 226 (1998).
" For multi-national sellers, arbitration has an added advantage. While judgments
rendered in one country may be difficult to enforce in another, international arbitral
awards are widely enforced under the New York Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards. In the United States, federal courts are given a broad
grant of jurisdiction to enforce these awards. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
" "Arbitration procedure is entirely a creature of the arbitration agreement. Thus,
whether discovery is permitted, whether fact or notice pleading is to be utilized, and the
applicability of different rules of evidence are all matters to be defined by the parties in
their arbitration agreement." Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The Role of
Intermediaries, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, at 186 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997).
",0 There is actually a third development that removed a technical barrier to making
online contracts binding. The new Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce
Act, signed by President Clinton on July 4, 2000, at Independence Hall, makes expressions
of assent such as clicking on the computer screen an adequate "signature" for purposes of
contract formation. S. 761, 106th Cong. (2000), available at http://thomas.loc.gov (last
visited Oct. 25, 2000). For discussions of this new law, see Barnaby J. Feder, Law on
Electronic Signatures Is Seen as a Boon to E-Business, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2000, available at
http://www.nytimes. com/library/tech/00/07/biztech/articles/O4digital.html, and
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increasingly feasible: 1) American courts' increasing willingness to
enforce arbitration agreements, even those contained in consumer
contracts of adhesion; and 2) a creeping acceptance of "buy now, terms
later" contracts in which terms such as arbitration clauses are added
after the consumer's initial purchase.4 2
Under the Federal Arbitration Act,' 43 where parties have entered into a
contract that calls for mandatory binding arbitration, that agreement will
be enforced. T4 That means that if a consumer attempts to ignore an
arbitration clause and file suit in court instead, that suit will be
dismissed. It also means that courts will enforce the arbitral award. The
federal courts have interpreted the Act broadly. For example, an
ambiguous contract will be interpreted in favor of arbitration rather than•. 145
litigation. When a party seeks to avoid an arbitration agreement on
grounds of coercion, fraud, or duress, those defenses are to be construed
narrowly. 46 The Federal Arbitration Act preempts all state legislation
that might try to limit the reach of binding arbitration.14  Finally, also
relying on the preference for arbitration, courts have severely limited the
grounds for appealing an arbitral award.1
Nicholas Morehead, The Age of E-Sigs Is Here, WIRED, Oct. 25, 2000, available at
http:/ /www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,37342,00.html.
14 See generally Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 267 (1995)
(discussing types of arbitration clauses and governing federal and state statutes);
Carrington, supra note 137 (proposing legislation to protect rights of employees,
consumers, and franchisees regarding choice of law and forum selection); Bryant G. Garth,
Privatization and the New Market for Disputes: A Framework for Analysis and a Preliminary
Assessment, in 12 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 367 (Susan S. Silbey & Austin
Sarat eds., 1992) (comparing private justice and public justice and trend toward their
combination); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 637 (1996) (criticizing courts' increasing
deferral to mandatory binding arbitration clauses).
" E.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808
(1997); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (enforcing choice of
forum clause printed on consumer cruise ticket received after payment).
" 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
', Id.§2.
... Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983).
'" David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir.)
(holding party to arbitration clause absent showing of special circumstances), cert.
dismissed, 501 U.S. 1267 (1991); Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 285
(9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting unconscionability defense in light of policy favoring arbitration).
" Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that FAA preempts
Montana statute mandating statement on first page of contract that contract contains
arbitration clause).
'" IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 40.1.4 (1996) ("Over the years, the courts
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The technology of the Internet also makes arbitration clauses
extremely simple to impose. They are generally included in the contract
by: 1) listinp them in the "Terms and Conditions" section of the seller's
Web page; 2) including them with the product so that'the customer
receives that information after she has paid but as she opens the box; or
3) included as so-called "cickwrap" - made part of a box that pops up
on the computer screen as the consumer attempts to download or install
software that requires the consumer to click "I Accept" before the
software will be installed.'s While traditional contracts scholars had
considered arbitration clauses imposed by any of these means to be
unenforceable attempts to add terms after the contract had been formed,
some courts have begun to endorse these so-called "layered contracts."5 '
Although a majority of jurisdictions might find some of these methods to
be unenforceable, 1 2 they are nevertheless often incorporated in the
documents and software. Many software licensing lawyers believe them
to be enforceable,13 and a consumer may believe a later claim that
have taken a fairly uniform approach to awards: Awards should be confirmed and
enforced as is unless there is clear evidence of a gross impropriety.").
"' Although there are some exceptions, these are generally indicated in tiny typeface at
the bottom of the seller's home page. Sometimes they will be cross-referenced while the
consumer is in mid-purchase, and sometimes they are just there in case anyone knows to
look for them.
" When the software is purchased from a physical store in a sealed box and the
contract terms appear while the program is being installed at home, the terms are
sometimes referred to as "shrinkwrap" terms. See, e.g., Dreben & Werbach, supra note 130,
at 19.
' See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 246 A.D.2d 246 (App. Div.
1998); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P2d 305 (Wash. 2000). The
trend towards recognizing layered contracts began with Judge Easterbrook's opinions in
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), and Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. 105
F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997). It is incorporated in the newly
proposed Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA), which has now been
adopted by the states of Maryland and Virginia. For a thoughtful discussion of the self-
help provisions of UCITA (which started life as proposed article 2B of the UCC but was
rejected by the American Law Institute), see Cohen, supra note 110.
52 Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Federal Law and Policy of Intellectual Property
Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REv. 111, 120 n.20 (1999) (citing numerous cases that rejected
shrinkwrap licenses as unenforceable); see, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d
1332 (D. Kan. 2000) (refusing to enforce certain terms).
" A 1995 survey of software licensing lawyers (that is lawyers who generally represent
software vendors) found that roughly two-thirds of them believed the terms of their
shrinkwrap license would govern any contract dispute. Lemley, supra note 14, at 1274; see
also Dreben & Werbach, supra note 130, at 18 ("Does your site have an applicable
agreement? Since the Seventh Circuit strongly upheld the viability of shrinkwrap licenses
in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, it now seems more likely than not that 'cickwraps' and
'terms and conditions' governing use of a web site will be enforceable."). A rational lawyer
for the software company could be expected to include any kind of clause favoring her
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litigation is unavailable and not challenge the clause.
The online seller may also be attracted by the availability of online
arbitration.5 4 This allows both the original transaction and the
resolution of any related disputes to take place without the physical
presence of the parties. There are currently more than half a dozen
online dispute resolution providers, as well as conventional providers
offering online options. Some provide online mediation, some have
algorithms that settle cases based on offers from opposing parties, and
some actually resolve the disputes 155 based on an e-mailed complaint and156
response. These providers tend to be for-profit entities, and the drafter
of the contract (the seller) gets to choose the provider. They can thus
choose a system of online arbitration with an acceptable cost structure
and an attractive set of procedural rules.7
The trend toward privatization through mandatory arbitration has
helped the repeat player achieve its goal of more favorable substantive
law, more favorable procedural law, and a potentially more favorable
decision maker. Assuming that this type of arbitration is cheaper and
faster than conventional litigation, it has achieved both efficiency and
preferred outcomes. The consumer, on the other hand, has potentially
been deprived of her home state's consumer protection law, forced to
litigate or arbitrate in an inconvenient forum, and been given procedural
systems that may limit her ability to prove a meritorious case.
client that had been approved by some court somewhere (or maybe even those that had not
been disapproved in the relevant jurisdiction). Such clauses may therefore tend to push the
envelope on pro-seller terms and conditions, and would certainly include terms that have
been enforced, regardless of the disapproval of legal academics. See generally Bailey
Kuklin, On the Knowing Inclusion of Unenforceable Contract and Lease Terms, 56 U. CN. L. REV.
845 (1988) (discussing benefits to drafter of including unenforceable terms).
1' Perritt, supra note 139, at 187.
1 See, e.g., I-Courthouse, at http://www.i-courthouse.com (last visited Oct. 25, 2000).
I-Courthouse allows opposing parties to prepare competing trial notebooks. Anyone with
access to the Internet can then sign up as a juror, read the parties' presentations, and
participate in the decision of any of the cases. For a fee, the parties can agree to submit the
case to an expert jury that meets specified demographic requirements.
" See generally M. Scott Donahey, Current Developments in Online Dispute Resolution, J.
INT'L ARB., Dec. 1999, at 115 (discussing various electronic settlement systems that allow
parties to submit complaints and responses via electronic file transfers); Katsch, supra note
131, at 6 (discussing emergence and growth of online dispute resolution). These online
services tend to come and go as their business plans succeed or fail, or their grants expire.
For a current list of existing providers of online dispute resolution (which would include
mediation as well as arbitration), see University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Center for
Information Technology and Dispute Resolution, at http:// www.umass.edu/dispute (last
visited Oct. 25, 2000).
"' See infra text accompanying notes 255-64.




Jack decides to buy a new home computer. He orders one online from
Pathway Computers, and it arrives in a box at his front door about a
week later. As Jack opens the box, he notices that it contains many
pieces of paper and other documentation. Some are advertisements for
other Pathway products, as well as other kinds of computer software.
Some are instruction manuals. One is a large diagram showing how to
connect all the pieces. Another is his limited warranty. Paragraph 9, on
page 6 of this document provides:
You agree that any Dispute between You and Pathway will be
resolved exclusively and finally by arbitration administered by the
American Arbitration Forum (AAF) and conducted under its rules,
except as otherwise provided below. The arbitration will be
conducted before a single arbitrator, and will be limited solely to the
Dispute between You and Pathway. The arbitration shall be held at
any reasonable location near your residence by submission of
documents, by telephone, online or in person. Any decision
rendered in such arbitration proceedings will be final and binding
on each of the parties, and judgment may be entered thereon in any
court of competent jurisdiction. Should either party bring a Dispute
in a forum other than AAF, the arbitrator may award the other party
its reasonable costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred
in staying or dismissing such other proceedings or in otherwise
enforcing compliance with this dispute resolution provision.
Jack does not actually read this document, but he keeps all the stuff that
came with the computer in the bottom drawer of his desk.
Two months later, when the computer crashes and loses all his data,
Jack contacts Pathway. They attempt to repair the computer but are
unable to do so. Jack believes that the crash was caused by a
manufacturing defect. He has heard that a number of Pathway
in the 1970s may provide a better remedy than the arbitration clause. Among its other
requirements, Regulation Z requires the issuer to provide certain dispute and error
resolution services. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13 (2000). This will provide incentive for online sellers
to help perfect the technology required for other kinds of electronic payment systems that
would not be burdened by Reg Z's consumer protections. See Jane Kaufman Winn, Clash of
the Titans: Regulating the Competition Between Established and Emerging Electronic Payment
Systems, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 675, 686-88 (1999); see also Alternative Dispute Resolution
for Consumer Transactions in the Borderless Online Marketplace, Comments to the Federal
Trade Commission from the National Consumers League, the Electronic Privacy Center, and
Consumer Federation of America (June 23, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/altdisresolution/
comments/ncl.htm.
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customers have had the same problem. He files a class action lawsuit
against Pathway in federal court in his home district. The federal judge,
relying on the arbitration clause, dismisses the case, and orders Jack to
pay Pathway's cost and attorneys fees.
Jack, determined to get some compensation, files a claim with the
AAF. He pays the $49 filing fee for consumer cases worth less than
$5,000.159 He requests discovery from Pathway, but the arbitrator
determines that the cost of producing the requested information would
be unduly expensive given the size of Jack's claim. (This is due in part to
the warranty's limitation of damages to a refund of the purchase price,
with all incidental, consequential, and punitive damages disclaimed, and
in part to AAF rules which prohibit class actions by limiting the dispute
to that between the complaining party and the respondent.) Jack
requests a "participatory hearing," pays the additional $75 fee, and
presents his case at the one-hour hearing. Jack loses. The arbitrator also
orders Jack, pursuant to AAF rules, to pay the fees paid by Pathway,
which total an additional $325.160
Josh McMahon lives in Maryland. He uses the FalseNetworks media
player to listen to the local college radio station. The FalseNetworks
software informs him automatically over the Internet that a free upgrade
is available should he choose to download it. Josh decides to do so. As
part of this process, a pop up screen appears with FalseNetworks terms
and conditions. At the end, under Miscellaneous, the following clause
appears:
This License Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State
of Washington, without regard to conflicts of law provisions, and
you hereby consent to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and
federal courts sitting in the State of Washington. Any and all
unresolved disputes relating in any way to, or arising out of, the
Software, your use of the Software or this License Agreement shall
be submitted to arbitration in the State of Washington; except that,
to the extent that you have breached or have indicated your
intention to breach this License Agreement in any manner which
violates or may violate FN's intellectual property rights, or may
' This is an improvement over Pathway's former arbitration clause, which required
arbitration with a service that required a $4,000 filing fee, only half of which was
refundable if the complainant prevailed. Cf. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997).
" Cf. National Arbitration Forum, Code of Procedure, Rule 37(C),
http://www.arbforum.com/library/code.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2000) [hereinafter NAF
Code of Procedure] (permitting arbitrator to shift fees and costs in award).
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cause continuing or irreparable harm to FN (including, but not
limited to, any breach that may impact FN's intellectual property
rights, or a breach by reverse engineering), FN may seek injunctive
relief, or any other appropriate relief, in any court of competent
jurisdiction. Any arbitration of a dispute under this Agreement
shall be conducted under the rules then prevailing of the American
Arbitration Association. The arbitrator's award shall be binding
and may be entered as a judgment in any court of competent
jurisdiction. This License Agreement will not be governed by the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, the application of which is hereby expressly excluded.
Josh, wanting to maximize the performance of his FalseNetworks
software, clicks "I Agree" so that he can download the software.
Unfortunately, the download wreaks havoc on his computer. He hires a
computer technician who, after four billable hours, is able to restore
Josh's computer to its original settings. He considers suing
FalseNetworks in small claims court, but remembers the terms and
conditions which he accepted. Although unable to return to it on his
computer (the pop up screen had no URL and could not be directly
printed), the computer-savvy Josh had copied the text into his
computer's Notepad and kept it for safekeeping. He discovers that
FalseNetworks had made no warranty whatsoever and limited his
damages to $5.00. Josh decides not to file an arbitration proceeding
thousands of miles from home when his total possible remedy is smaller
than the filing fee.
FalseNetworks learns (using a trusted system) that Josh has been
trying to reverse engineer the program to try to make some
improvements in the player. They fear that he will try to market such an
improved product. Because FalseNetworks is not bound by its own
arbitration clause it sues Josh for injunctive relief and damages in federal
court in the state of Washington.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATIZED DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The technology of the Internet, together with its surrounding political
and legal environment, provide new contexts for old problems: the
effects of differing resources on procedural systems, the advantages of
161 One indication that the drafters of form contracts are well aware of the procedural
limitations of the arbitration device can be found in "one-way" arbitration clauses. These
clauses limit the consumer to arbitration, but retain for the seller the option to file suit in a
conventional court.
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repeat players, the cost of justly resolving economically small disputes,
the allocation of the burden of legal uncertainty, the disharmony of
potentially applicable law. When it comes to the Internet, the
government's awe of the booming "new economy," the rapid speed of
technological change, and the market power of the major players tends
to lead toward private solutions to these public problems. This section of
the article will discuss some of the consequences of this choice: 1)
procedural privatization; 2) shift of procedural advantage to the already-
powerful; 3) due process gaps; and 4) privatized substantive law in favor
of trademark holders, copyright owners, and sellers. Just as in the
physical world differential resources and repeat player status provide
advantages, so too with the Internet. These processes shift the cost of
making a claim and the burden of uncertainty onto the less powerful
disputant.
A. Procedural Privatization
It may go without saying that the dispute resolution systems discussed
.... 162
in Section II are privatized systems, at least in part. Part of the
motivation for opting out of the court system is the ability to create a
system of one's own in which the rules and the decision maker are not
those of traditional courts. The extent of privatization should be
critically examined because of the other consequences that follow from
the fact that private parties are making or enforcing the rules.
The ICANN dispute resolution procedure is essentially a private one.
ICANN is a private non-profit corporation. Although it serves a public
function,' 63 ICANN needed and still needs "the concurrence of every
powerful party with an interest in domain name policy." '64 In addition
to governments (especially the U.S. and the European Union) this
" In a jurisprudential sense, concepts of private and public law are artificially
distinguished. All law is in a sense public law. See Radin & Wagner, supra note 15, at 1295-
97. This section of the article uses the word "private" in the sense that the procedural rules
are made and implemented by non-government actors.
" Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (Dep't
Commerce June 10, 1998), available at 1998 WL 298883 (calling for a new organization to
administer the domain name system).
' Zittrain, supra note 29, at 1083. Others have accused WIPO of being captive to
corporate interests. "What we're looking at here is a coup by WIPO over every other body
set up to resolve Internet argy-bargy. And how do you run a coup? You get either military
[or] the money-makers on your side. Seeing as there isn't any Internet military, it has gone
for the fat and rich corporations." Kieren McCarthy, Who the hell does WIPO think it is?, THE
REGISTER, Aug. 16, 2000, http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/5/12638.html.
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includes Internet engineering groups and trademark interests. 6s ICANN
"faces swift dispatch if it strays too far from the desires of... powerful
corporate interests." 16 ICANN itself, then, is a sort of hybrid institution,
and ICANN developed1 7 its domain name dispute policy and the rules
for implementing it with the input of these key groups.
The ICANN Policy for domain name disputes operates through
wholly private means. The dispute resolution providers are not courts
and judges but rather providers of private arbitrators. The rules of
procedure are sui generis, with their own pleading rules, service rules,
time limits, and decision makers. The dispute resolution provider
decides the sufficiency of the complaint. The arbitrator has discretion to
conduct the proceedings "in such manner as it considers appropriate.
The arbitrator also determines the "admissibility, relevance, materiality
and weight of the evidence." 69  The arbitrator decides whether to
consolidate multiple disputes, and whether to suspend or terminate the
ICANN proceedings if a court proceeding is filed.
1 7
The notice and take-down provisions of the DMCA are also privately-
operated. 7' They depend on turning the ISP into the copyright holder's
enforcer. Thus a private copyright holder complains to a private ISP,
which in turn privately implements the remedy of disabling access to the
challenged portions of a Web site. Unless the Web site owner files a
lawsuit, the entire process takes place out of the public eye. It is
commenced by a private party in a private setting and enforced by
another private party. There is no court, no hearing, and no decision on
the issue of copyright infringement.
Trusted systems and DRMs are even farther from a court system. Both
the DRMs that restrict use and those that disable software in response to
perceived violations of intellectual property rights operate automatically.
63 Zittrain, supra note 29, at 1083.
16 Id. at 1091.
167 The initial version of the policy was actually developed by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO). A number of governments have recently appealed to
WIPO to consider amending the domain name system to handle issues such as famous
names, geographic locations, and un-trademarked trade names. See Geist, supra note 40
(discussing pending WIPO discussion paper that would expand domain name dispute
process to geographical, personal, and trade names).
16 ICANN Rules, supra note 33, at § 10(a).
16 Id. § 10(d).
170 Id. § 10(e).
6 The rules themselves were adopted by Congress rather than by a private body.
They were, however, the product of negotiations between copyright holders and Internet
service providers and were then endorsed by Congress. The voice of the general public
was not generally represented in fashioning this legislation. Jackson, supra note 75, at 65.
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There is no complaint, no response and no dispute resolution provider.
There is certainly no court involvement in determining the remedy''
There is not even a human involved in invoking the DRM.
Arbitration clauses likewise provide for a private procedural scheme.
Each arbitration provider has its own rules of procedure. The parties
choose (or are assigned) their arbitrator, a private individual (who may
or may not be a lawyer) who is not part of a court system. The arbitrator
implements the privately-determined rules according to the parties'
privately-negotiated contract.
If a person is unhappy with the results of any of these processes, and
has sufficient resources, all can be challenged in court to some extent.
The results of the ICANN process are not binding. A party who wishes
to challenge the results can file a lawsuit against the party who prevailed
in the private process. Absent such a challenge, however, the ICANN
remedy will take effect. Similarly, the Web site owner whose site has
been taken down under the DMCA notice and take-down provisions,
may restore it to the Internet by prevailing in the copyright holder's
lawsuit. The site will stay down while the suit is pending. A party who
believes that a trusted system has unlawfully denied it some lawful use
may file suit against the seller/licensor, unless prevented from doing so
by an arbitration clause. Absent a lawsuit, the system has already taken
effect. A party who believes an arbitration clause is unenforceable can
challenge it in court and if successful, resolve her dispute in court rather
than through private arbitration. A party who believes that an
arbitrator's ruling is subject to challenge may file suit to try to set aside
the arbitral award.'73 Thus, in many cases, a public forum is ultimately
available, but only to the well-funded. Further, the force of inertia works
in favor of the private process outcome.
Privatization in and of itself does not necessarily disadvantage either
party. However, three of the privatized systems shift procedural
advantages from one disputant to the other. Further, all four privatized
processes circumvent meaningful due process protections that are
implicit in a court of law.
" Government is indirectly involved if it passes legislation such as UCITA which
endorses this technology and allows adhesion contracts to legitimize it.
" The standard of review, however, makes it extremely unlikely that the arbitral
award will be set aside. MACNEIL, supra note 148, at 40.1.4.
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B. Shift of Procedural Advantage
The ICANN domain name process, the DMCA notice and take-down
provisions, and trusted system technology all operate to give one
disputant the equivalent of a preliminary injunction without requiring
the usual quantum of proof or applying the normally-applicable law. A
preliminary injunction is an order from the court, issued before the
lawsuit is finally determined on the merits, directing the defendant to do
something, or refrain from doing something, during the pendency of the
lawsuit. 174  Courts generally approach preliminary injunctions with
caution, because they operate under several disadvantages. The issue
must be determined before full discovery; there has been little time to
research the applicable law; there has been no determination that the
plaintiff will ultimately be entitled to an injunction; and granting the
injunction for the interim may do significant harm to the defendant or to
third persons, sometimes harm which is difficult to compensate
retroactively.
Because of these circumstances, courts generally use a balancing test in
deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction. They consider the
plaintiff's probability of success on the merits and the harm to the
plaintiff if the preliminary injunction is not granted.'75 It must be the
type of harm that cannot be adequately redressed by awarding an
injunction and/or damages at the conclusion of the lawsuit. 76 This is
generally referred to as showing irreparable injury. They balance against
this the probable harm to the defendant if the injunction is wrongfully
granted, and also consider the impact of a preliminary injunction on the
public interest.'7 If the plaintiff successfully convinces the court that the
balance of equities favors the preliminary injunction, it will generally be
required to post a bond to help compensate the defendant for the
damages that may be done by an injunction that is later reversed.' 78
From a procedural standpoint, the party seeking the injunction must
hire a lawyer to draft a complaint, gather information both informally
and through discovery, and request a hearing in which it presents to the
judge the evidence that it believes justifies the preliminary relief. Such
17, See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, PRAcTITIONERS TREATISE § 2.11(1), at 249-50
(2d ed. 1993) (explaining that preliminary injunctions issue after notice to defendant and
opportunity to be heard and remain in place until further order of court).
See id. § 2.11(2), at 253.
,76 See id. § 2.11(2), at 253-54.
Id. § 2.11(2), at 253-63 (discussing general requirements for preliminary injunctions).
,' FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
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hearings can be elaborate and expensive since the court must consider
the strength of the plaintiff's case on the merits, and the damages to both
parties that could flow from issuing or not issuing the injunction.'7 The
more fact-intensive the issues, the more evidence-intensive the hearing is
apt to be; live testimony, cross-examination of witnesses, introduction of
documents and other tangible evidence, and oral argument from the
attorneys would all be typical of a preliminary injunction hearing.
1. ICANN Domain Name Disputes
In the case of domain name disputes, the trademark holder is in the
position of a plaintiff. Absent the informal ICANN process, the
trademark holder has to file a lawsuit against the domain name owner,
alleging trademark infringement and violation of the newly-passed Anti-
cybersquatting Consumers Protection Act (ACPA).18° The lawsuit will
seek cancellation or transfer of the domain name and, possibly, statutory
or actual damages.'8' The plaintiff will have to locate and serve the
domain name owner.18 2 To secure a preliminary injunction hearing, it
will need to assemble (and put into admissible form) the information
needed to prove that it will ultimately prevail on the merits, and that it
will be irreparably injured if it has to wait until the conclusion of the
litigation for relief. Its lawyer will need to write a brief arguing to the
court why it satisfies the requirements for preliminary relief.'
What about the domain name holder? It will need to file an answer
which, in federal court, will require a paragraph by paragraph response
to the complaint.184 It will also be allowed to assemble evidence for the
preliminary injunction hearing, including evidence showing that its use
179 But see 1 DOBBS, supra note 174, § 2.11(1), at 249 (observing that motion may be
decided based on affidavits).
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West 1996 & Supp. 2000) (amending section 43 of Lanham
Act).
... The Lanham Act specifically authorizes injunctive relief. Id. § 1116(a).
182 The ACPA also allows an in rem civil action against the domain name if the
trademark owner shows that it was unable to find the defendant despite due diligence. Id.
§ 1125(d)(2)(A). The Fourth Circuit (which is the geographic location of Network
Solutions, Inc., and therefore the most probable location for in rem actions) has reserved
the issue of the constitutionality of this provision, and it has been upheld by the Eastern
District of Virginia. See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Allporsche.com, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1158
(4th Cir. 2000) (noting that Porsche filed in rem action against 128 domain names); Lucent
Techs. Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D. Va. 2000); Caesars World, Inc. v.
Caesars-Palace.Com, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1121 (E.D. Va. 2000).
11 Preliminary injunctions in trademark cases are subject to the same constraints as
preliminary injunctions generally. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 174, § 6.4(5), at 100.
184 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b).
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of the domain name is legitimate and that it has acted in good faith. At
the hearing, it will be allowed to call its own witnesses and cross-
examine the witnesses called by the trademark owner. It, too, will write a
brief addressing its defenses on the merits and its probable harm should
an injunction be granted.
Compare this to the ICANN process which grants the equivalent of a
preliminary or even permanent injunction to a trademark holder with
much lower procedural hurdles. The trademark owner files a complaint
amounting to a fact pleading, and attaches evidence of the trademark. If
the domain name owner has done anything in writing that suggests bad
faith (such as offering to sell the domain name at an inflated price), the
writing can also be attached. The trademark owner pays a filing fee.
The domain name holder prepares and files a written response, and can
also attach any documents that might be in its possession showing good
faith. There is no discovery. There is no hearing to prepare for. There is
no brief to write, except to the extent that arguments are included in the
complaint or response. The substantive standards to be applied are
unique to ICANN, and require somewhat less of the trademark owner
than the corresponding U.S. law.lss The case is quickly assigned to an
arbitrator, and a decision reached within 14 days.'86 If the arbitrator rules
for the trademark owner (as they have 80% of the time), the ruling
results in cancellation or transfer of the domain name, which is the final
relief the trademark owner seeks.' 87 In the absence of a lawsuit, then, the
ICANN process operates not as a preliminary injunction but as a final,
permanent one. Even if the domain name owner has the will and
resources to challenge the ICANN result, the procedural advantage has
shifted: it is the domain name holder, not the trademark owner, who
must file a lawsuit and it is cancellation or transfer that becomes the
default result.
1"5 See supra note 38. It may even require less than the language of the ICANN Policy
itself would seem to indicate. For example, the Policy requires a finding of bad faith
registration and use. Some arbitrators have nevertheless ordered domain names
transferred when the domain name has not been used at all (except that it has been
registered). See, e.g., Telestra Corp. v. Nuclear Marshmallows, Case No. D2000-0003 (WIPO
Feb. 18, 2000), http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-OOO3.html.
But see, e.g., Sporoptic Pouilloux S.A. v. Wilson, Case No. D2000-0265 (WIPO June 16, 2000),
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-O265.html (requiring both
registration and use).
186 ICANN Rules, supra note 33, § 15(b).
187 ICANN Policy, supra note 32, § 3(c).
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2. Notice and Take-Down under the DMCA
The DMCA deals with copyright rather than trademark. Prior to the
DMCA notice and take-down provisions, the copyright holder who
believed its copyright was being infringed had to file a lawsuit against
the offending user. In order to get preliminary relief stopping the
challenged use, it had to follow the procedures described above. This is
generally somewhat simpler in copyright cases, since much of the
evidence is documentary. l m Courts are also more 9 rone to grant
preliminary injunctions in copyright infringement cases. There is still a
requirement, however, that the copyright holder prove probable success
on the merits (e.g. that it holds the copyright and that the challenged
material infringes it). The burden for injunctive relief is appropriately
high; "even if free expression is adequately protected by the fair use and
other copyright rules, injunctive relief against expression is a troubling
remedy at best. With this concern in mind, the copyright owner may be
left to the money remedies in some cases, or at least denied a preliminary
injunction." 19 In order to obtain relief against an ISP, the copyright
holder had to file a lawsuit charging contributory infringement or
vicarious liability and prove its entitlement to a preliminary injunction.19
Under the DMCA, the copyright holder merely needs to file, with the
ISP, a notice of infringement listing its copyrighted material and the
alleged infringing Web pages. Having done that, the copyright holder
achieves, at a minimum, a ten to fourteen working day take down of the
challenged material. This is, in a sense, the equivalent of a temporary
restraining order (TRO), a kind of very temporary injunction parties
sometimes request ex parte when filing a lawsuit. Such orders, however,
are generally issued to preserve the status quo until a judge can hold an
evidentiary hearing with all parties present. 92 The notice and take-down
provisions, in contrast, reverse the position of the parties. Before the
notice is filed the Web site is up and accessible; after the notice it is
" Interview with John Cone, Partner, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld (July 10,
2000).
" Injunctions, including preliminary injunctions, are authorized by the copyright
statute. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
190 2 DOBBS, supra note 174, § 6.3(2), at 55.
11 Injunctive relief against the ISP is provided for in the DMCA. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(j)
(West Supp. 2000).
" The concept of status quo is, of course, a manipulable one. Judges sometimes issue
orders that in fact change the positions of the parties, and claim that the status quo was the
situation that existed before defendant violated plaintiff's rights. See generally Douglas
Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARv. L. REv. 687, 728 (1990)
(discussing costs preliminary orders impose on defendants).
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down. Even if the Web site owner files a counter notification, the take-
down will last at least ten days. The advantage to the copyright owner
also continues: if it merely files a lawsuit, the Web site will remain down.
It need not request and prove the need for interim relief. Thus without
any consideration of evidence or any proof of copyright infringement,
the copyright holder has been given the equivalent of a preliminary
injunction.
3. Trusted Systems
It's difficult to compare an automated process, which most closely
resembles self-help, to the process for acquiring a preliminary injunction.
There are, however, some parallels. Consider the relationship of the
copyright owner to its licensee absent the DRM. If the owner believes
the licensee is breaching the license agreement by engaging in unlicensed
uses, it must file a lawsuit. In that lawsuit it can seek damages for past
breaches, and it may seek injunctive relief,'94 although damages are the
norm in breach of contract cases. 195  It might request a preliminary
injunction ordering that the challenged practice cease for the duration of
the lawsuit. To secure such an injunction, it would have to meet the
requirements discussed above.
The DRMs eliminate the need for an injunction and completely reverse
the parties' procedural posture. One type of DRM prevents the licensee
from engaging in an unauthorized use (or charges fees for expanded use,
as if it were an award of damages measured by a license fee). This is the
equivalent of a permanent injunction against the expanded use. Another
type of DRM disables the software when it detects an unauthorized196
use. This constitutes a permanent injunction against the expanded use
193 Jackson, supra note 75, at 83.
19 See Brookings Mall, Inc. v. Captain Ahab's Ltd., 300 N.W.2d 259, 263-65 (S.D. 1980)
(enjoining shopping center tenant from selling certain articles forbidden by lease).
"' Under the traditional rule, injunctive relief will be denied if damages provide an
adequate remedy. This often results in the denial of specific performance decrees in breach
of contract cases. 3 DOBBS, supra note 174, § 12.8(2), at 197-98. Where damages would be
difficult to measure, however, an injunction may be warranted.
19 See John Markoff, New System for PC Music Stirs Concern Over Piracy, N.Y. Times,
May 3, 1999, at C1 (noting that RealNetworks strategies for protecting and distributing
music over Internet includes tethering technology whereby digital copies of tracks from
audio CDs are limited to single copies); see also RealNetworks.com, Sony and RealNetworks
Announce Strategic Alliance for Secure Electronic Music Distribution (Jan. 7, 2000), at
http://www.realnetworks.com/company/pressroom/pr/00/sony.html (describing
Sony's digital rights management system consisting of "MagicGate" and "OpenMG"
components, which limit where and how many times given song may be copied).
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and a penalty against the user, termination of her license. Whether the
best analogy is a preliminary rather than a permanent injunction
depends on the reaction of the licensee. If she does nothing, the DRM
has in effect granted a permanent injunction. If the licensee has
sufficient motivation and resources to contest the DRM's action, she can
file a lawsuit charging that the licensor has breached the license
agreement and seeking damages. During the pendency of that lawsuit,
however, the licensee has still lost use of the product. In this sense, the
action of the DRM functions as a preliminary injunction.
The DRMs arguably provide the starkest shift of procedural
advantage. The licensor does not even have to file a complaint, much
less prove an entitlement to an injunction from a balance of the equities.
The enforcement procedure was pre-programmed into the software. The
licensee receives no notice of the action, no opportunity to argue that it
had not breached the license, no third party decision maker considering
the law and the facts. And it is, once again, the party on the "losing" end
of the Internet process that must fight inertia and file a lawsuit.
C. Due Process Gaps and Repeat Player Advantages
When a lawsuit is filed and processed in a court in the United States,
certain procedural steps are available of right to the parties.'97 Some of
these are required by Constitutional due process. Others have come to
be assumed as part of a fair system for learning about and resolving
complex factual disputes, and for applying the law to those facts.
Privatized processes can be designed to eliminate those procedures that
their designers deem too expensive or too disadvantageous.' 99 The
processes discussed in this article tend to eliminate or minimize many
important procedural rights implicit in a court proceeding: affordable
access to the courts, notice, discovery, collective action, live hearings and
cross-examination of witnesses, the use of unbiased decision makers,
process transparency, and written, reasoned opinions. Changes to these
procedural devices are not mere matters of institutional quirk or
"9 See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 3 (granting appeal as matter of right from United States
district court to court of appeals)
'" For example, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant in the absence of reasonable notice. Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); see also FED. R. Cirv. P. 4. In addition,
the United States Supreme Court has held that due process requires that a defendant be
afforded an opportunity to be heard. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
19 Private processes such as arbitration are "entirely a creature of the arbitration
agreement." Perritt, supra note 139, at 186.
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economic efficiency. Litigators know that procedural rules affect• 200
substantive outcomes. It is not surprising that the repeat players who
have created (or lobbied in favor of) the privatized processes have
created processes that work to their benefit. 201
1. Access to Justice
As discussed in Section II.B above, the dispute resolution processes
created for the Internet sometimes shift the burden of initiating suit.
This shift affects access to justice. If the domain name holder who has
lost the ICANN proceeding cannot afford to hire an attorney to draft a
complaint and to pay the filing and service fees for a lawsuit, the domain
name is gone. If the consumer whose software has been disabled by a
DRM cannot afford to pay the filing and service fees for a lawsuit, the
software is gone. The mere fact of shifting the benefit of inertia has
changed the likelihood that a party can seek outside adjudication of its
claims.2°2
In addition, some of the private processes charge higher initial filing
fees than would a corresponding court process. This is particularly true
of mandatory arbitration clauses, although the cost will vary from
provider to provider, and the impact will vary from consumer to
consumer and with the cost of the disputed item. If the costs are too
high for the consumer to afford, the claim will not be filed.20 If the costs
' Sternlight, supra note 141, at 680. Cf Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The
Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1 (1995) ("[Flor
those who think that, in theory, rules of procedure should be outcome neutral, the extent to
which substance is, in fact, modulated by process can be hard to appreciate.")
2. See Garth, supra note 141, at 368; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL.
19 (1999).
22 Even non-binding but mandatory arbitration can decrease access by increasing costs.
If, for example, a consumer were required to first exhaust any internal dispute procedure
used by the merchant, then to use a third-party arbitration procedure that is not binding on
either party, and only then file a lawsuit, the process has increased the consumer's cost in
time and money of seeking relief. This explains why the dispute resolution proposal of the
e-commerce giants requires such exhaustion and why consumer groups object to it. See
Brian Krebs, Groups Embrace E-commerce Dispute-resolution Plan, NEWSBYrES, June 7, 2000,
available at http://www.computeruser.com/news/00/06/07/news13.html (last visited
Oct. 30, 2000) (describing industry-led proposal regarding dispute resolution methods for
e-commerce consumers); Electronic Commerce and Consumer Protection Group,
Guidelines, § XIV, http://www.ecommercegroup.org/guidelines.htm (last visited Oct. 30,
2000) [hereinafter Guidelines] (explaining dispute resolution guidelines for e-commerce
merchants).
2" While courts tend to have provisions allowing a plaintiff to prove indigency and
institute a lawsuit without paying the usual fees, not all arbitration services do so. The
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are excessive in relation to the value of the disputed product, the claim
will not be filed. Best practices within the dispute resolution community
indicate that arbitration services in consumer cases should be available at
a "reasonable cost to [clonsumers based on the circumstances of the
dispute, including among other things, the size and nature of the claim,
the nature of goods or services provided, and the ability of the
[c]onsumer to pay."204 In a private system, however, the drafter of the
arbitration provision need not follow best practices.
The problem of excessive fees is not an imaginary one. In Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc.,205 Gateway's arbitration clause called for a dispute
resolution provider, the International Chamber of Commerce, whose
filing fee was $4,000. This far exceeded the cost of the computer that was
the subject of the dispute. Even modest sounding fees can be excessive
under certain circumstances. The National Arbitration Forum has a
relatively modest $49 fee for filing consumer claims.206 However, there
are additional fees for hearings. And, if the consumer loses, NAF has a
cost-shifting system that means that the consumer could be required to
pay the merchant's fees.2 07 Even a $49 fee is a sufficient deterrent when
filing a claim for damages from a defective $50 program or $75 dress
ordered off the Internet. a' Some courts will refuse to enforce arbitration
clauses if they find the fees to be excessive. 2 9 Other courts enforce them
Better Business Bureau runs a consumer arbitration system in which the consumer pays no
fee. See generally Better Business Bureau, http://www.bbb.org/complaints
/aboutResolution.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2000) (outlining details of Better Business
Bureau's consumer arbitration program).
2"4 American Arbitration Association, Consumer Due Process Protocol: Statement of
Principles of the National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee, Principle 6(1) (1998),
http://www.adr.org/education/education/consumer-protocol.html (last visited Oct. 30,
2000) [hereinafter AAA Statement of Principles].
2- 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997).
206 The American Arbitration Association's filing fee for consumers is $125. American
Arbitration Association, Arbitration Rules for the Resolution of Consumer-Related
Disputes (Apr. 1, 2000), http://www.adr.org (last visited Nov. 25, 2000). Responding
parties also pay a $125 fee for the arbitrator plus a $500 administration fee. Id.
See discussion supra Part II.D.2 (setting forth Jack Just hypothetical).
22 This problem of the cost of disputing small ticket items is also a problem in real
world transactions. Consumers in such situations are probably better served by effective
return/refund policies than by an inexpensive dispute resolution process.
2" Letter from F. Paul Bland, Jr., Staff Attorney, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, to
Secretary, Federal Trade Commission, at 6 (Mar. 20, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/altdisresolution/comments/blandjr.pdf (last visited Oct. 30,
2000) [hereinafter TLPJ Letter to FTC]; see, e.g., Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d
1149 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that defendant failed to show costs would be reasonable);
Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (l1th Cir. 1998) (dicussing
within context of employment arbitration); Brower v. Gateway 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y.
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without seriously discussing the problem of costs. 210 When this happens,
the fees restrict access to justice."
2. Notice and Opportunity to Respond
Another component of procedural fairness is the right to receive
timely and meaningful notice that a claim has been asserted. 21 This kind
of notice is not required to be provided under two of the privatized
systems. First, the DMCA notice and take-down procedures require the
ISP to disable access to the challenged Web site "expeditiously" in order
to avoid potential liability of its own. The duty to notify the Web site
holder of the take-down does not take effect until after the site has been
disconnected, and the site will stay down for at least ten business days.
The copyright holder thus achieves ex parte suppression of the allegedly
infringing material without demonstrating to a court why it should
receive such relief, and without further demonstrating why it should be
211granted that relief before contacting the Web site owner for a response.
App. Div. 1998) (finding $4,000 International Chamber of Commerce filing fee excessive
but ordering arbitration under FAA); Myers v. Terminex Int'l, 697 N.E.2d 277 (Ohio Ct.
Com. Pleas 1998) (holding that undisclosed and costly filing fee rendered arbitration clause
unconscionable and unenforceable).
210 TLPJ Letter to FTC, supra note 209, at 6; see, e.g., Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1999); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. 105 F.3d
1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997); Doctor's Assocs. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975 (2d
Cir. 1996) (examining commercial franchise agreement).
... Fees are not the only barrier to access. Another common device is the forum
selection clause. The adhesion contracts may specify not only arbitration but also choose a
forum that is convenient to the seller but extremely inconvenient for the consumer.
Unfortunately, this problem is not confined to Internet transactions but also exists in
litigation generally. See discussion supra Part II.D.1. For that reason, ICANN is to be
commended for generally making the domain name holder's domicile a proper forum for a
lawsuit challenging the arbitral findings. See ICANN Rules, supra note 33, § 1. Similarly, the
DMCA seems to envision (although it does not require) that the lawsuit filed by the
copyright holder to retain suppression of the web site will be filed in the federal district
that includes the web site owner's home. 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(g)(3)(D) (West Supp. 2000).
212 See generally Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (holding
notice to be component of due process).
213 The notice and take-down provisions thus operate as a kind of court-free TRO, a
surrogate emergency ex parte injunction. Many courts, however, will not grant temporary
restraining orders unless the plaintiff demonstrates both the urgency of the request (e.g.,
that an irreplaceable tree is about to be cut down) and the reason that the defendant has not
been contacted and given an opportunity to appear before the court and present its side of
the argument (e.g., defendant would quickly act to subvert the injunction--cut down the
tree-if given advance notice). In order to receive such an order, plaintiff would also have
to post a bond to compensate the defendant for its damages should it turn out that the TRO
was erroneously granted.
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Second, DRMs can operate like a notice-free lawsuit. The software
detects what it believes to be a violation, by surreptitiously contacting
the licensee's computer, and then imposes its own sanction. The licensee
is not given notice that a violation is suspected, nor given an opportunity
to explain herself. The self-help remedy proceeds automatically.
Similarly, if less drastic, are the DRMs that merely prevent the licensee
from using the product in some way. These DRMs act as a substitute for
suits to enjoin that use and to collect damages. Depending on the clarity
of the online contract, the consumer may have generalized notice that
such action is possible, but her first notice that the right has been
invoked will be the remedy itself.
214
3. Adequate Discovery
Discovery exists as a litigation tool in order to provide all parties with
access to all relevant information. Once the parties are aware of that
information, they can present a fuller account to the trier of fact. This, in
turn, leads to more fair and accurate trial outcomes.215  Discovery is
particularly necessary because at the outset of many lawsuits, the
stronger party is most likely to have the bulk of relevant information,
216
while the weaker party is apt to lack such information. When a private
dispute resolution system limits discovery, it limits a device that
otherwise serves to equalize the parties' relative positions within the
lawsuit; "to the extent that the private system's inquiry is less thorough,
the private system permits the underlying power of the stronger party to
persist undeflected."
217
None of the systems under review permit as much discovery as a civil
lawsuit, and many provide none at all. Arbitrators under the ICANN
211 Professor Julie Cohen compares these systems with self-help repossession of a sofa.
Imagine a "license" term that prohibits more than three people from sitting on the sofa at
one time. Suppose three adults are sitting on the sofa and the child of one of those adults
wants to sit on his parent's lap. DRMs that prevent unlicensed uses would have the effect
of creating a force field around the sofa so that the child could not sit. DRMs that disable
software on perceived violation would cause the sofa to vanish, dumping its former
occupants onto the floor. Cohen, supra note 110, at 1115-16. Neither action resembles a
customary sort of pre-resolution notice.
215 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (discussing value and purpose of
discovery).
216 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROcEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 5422, at 674 (1980); Elizabeth G. Thomburg,
Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 157, 203 (1993).
21 Garth, supra note 141, at 382.
[Vol. 34:151
Going Private
dispute resolution system base their decisions on a complaint from the
trademark owner and, in the absence of default, a response from the
domain name registrant."' Each side only gets one chance to submit its
219position and attach documents to which it already has access.
Although theoretically the arbitrator can request further statements or
documents, the arbitrator can only request documents that she knows
about, and such action seems highly unlikely when the decision must be
rendered in fourteen days. That process leaves the complainant with no
method of learning more about the respondent's intent or use of the
domain name; it leaves the respondent with no method of learning more
about the trademark owner's right to the mark. This lack of discovery
might be relatively insignificant in the egregious cases of cybersquatting
for which the process was designed. It will be more problematic in
genuinely contested cases and cases in which the complainant is relying
on a common law right rather than a registered trademark.2°0
Arbitration of consumer disputes may or may not involve discovery.2
1
Since the arbitration system is created by a contract drafted by the seller,
it is unlikely to include discovery if the seller believes that discovery
would be either harmful or too expensive. Neither the American
Arbitration Association's "Statement of Principles" for consumer
arbitration nor the "Guidelines" recently promulgated by the Electronic
Commerce Consumer Protection Group mentions a right to discovery.
It is apparently not considered to be an industry "best practice."
Limits on discovery will not operate even-handedly on the parties to
consumer arbitration:
One way defendants can decrease a consumer's expected return is
:18 See ICANN Rules, supra note 33, § 15.
219 See ICANN Rules, supra note 33, § 12.
The virtually automatic procedures of the DMCA and trusted systems naturally
employ nothing like discovery. There is no discovery prior to web site take-down under
the DMCA; this action is triggered by a complaint that consists of a naked claim with a list
of copyrighted materials and infringing materials. The trusted systems software operates
automatically, so clearly there is no discovery involved. See discussion supra Parts I.A.2-3,
II.B.2 (discussing ICANN and DMCA).
22 Perritt, supra note 139, at 186.
AAA Statement of Principles, supra note 204. Nor do the AAA consumer arbitration
rules contain any mention of discovery. See American Arbitration
Association,http://www.adr.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2000); Guidelines, supra note 202.
Contrary to what one might expect from its name, the Electronic Commerce Consumer
Protection Group is not composed of consumer advocates but of America Online, AT&T,
Dell Computer Corporation, IBM, Microsoft, Network Solutions, Time Warner Inc. and
Visa U.S.A. Inc. See Electronic Commerce and Consumer Protection Group,
http://www.ecommercegroup.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2000).
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to prevent the consumer from engaging in adequate discovery.
Because the consumer will be more needful of discovery than will
the company, which maintains the relevant records and has
continuing access to the decision makers, even a seemingly neutral
restriction on discovery will affect consumers adversely.
The online consumer knows that the product she purchased is defective.
She knows the way(s) in which she believes the product has failed to
meet her needs, or to live up to its description. She does not, however,
have access to records concerning the product's design or manufacture,
complaints from others that might show the existence of a defect or the
seller's knowledge of the problem, or internal communications
concerning the product. Neither does the consumer have access to the
people who made the relevant decisions. An arbitration system that
allows a dispute to be decided when only the defendant has access to
this relevant and potentially incriminating information will lead to
inaccurate and one-sided results224
A move toward arbitrating consumer complaints online seems
unlikely to make any difference, at least not with current providers.
Existing online dispute resolution systems are not particularly geared
either toward arbitration (except ICANN arbitration) or toward
compelled processes. Cybersettle,m ClicknSettle,2 and SettleOnline
2 7
are all aimed at streamlining settlements. The parties, if they elect to
participate, submit confidential settlement offers which are compared by
the companies' software.] This kind of process does not involve fact
finding, and so there is no discovery process (the parties may, of course,
have engaged in conventional litigation including discovery before using
the computerized settlement software). I-Courthouse, which is also
' Sternlight, supra note 141, at 683.
" See Budnitz, supra note 141, at 271-72 (noting that limiting or eliminating discovery
gives advantage to non-consumer); Sternlight, supra note 141, at 683-84 (observing that
even seemingly neutral restriction on discovery will adversely affect consumers because of
consumers' greater need for discovery than company that maintains relevant records and
has continuing access to decisionmakers).
' Cybersettle, at http://www.cybersettle.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2000).
" ClickNSettle, at http://www.clicknsettle.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2000).
' SettleOnline, at http://www.settleonline.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2000).
1 See ClickNSsettle, Online Negotiation, at http://www.clicknsettle.com/onineneg.cfm
(last visited Oct. 30, 2000); Cybersettle, About Cybersettle, at
http://www.cybersettle.com/about/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2000); SettleOnline,
How it Works, at http://www.settleonline.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2000). If the parties'
offers are within a certain range, the computer will end the dispute by splitting the
difference. See ClickNSettle, Online Negotiation, supra (stating that automatic split triggered
when plaintiff's demand comes within 30% of defendant's offer).
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voluntary, focuses on the trial portion of dispute resolution and enables
online jurors to find for a plaintiff or defendant based on trial notebook
presentations.2 It also assumes that theParties already have all needed
information before invoking its process. Other online providers focus
primarily on mediation rather than arbitration, and similarly do not
include discovery as part of their procedures (except for the fact that
some information may be discovered during the course of
negotiations).2a1
The cost of undertaking thorough discovery for very small claims is a
problem for both real space and cyberspace. It may not be rational to
spend $10,000 resolving a dispute over a single $50 product. Decisions
about how to allocate cost are political decisions about policy, not simple
economic calculations. Should the consumer bear the cost? Should the
manufacturer? Should the taxpayer? For cases in which discovery is
required for a fair and accurate resolution, however, a process which
eliminates discovery is a sham. The apparent existence of an inexpensive
mechanism for resolving disputes may convince the buyer ex ante that it
is safe to make a purchase. 2 But it will not serve the unhappy consumer
See I-Courthouse, supra note 155.
See id. Attorneys may use I-Courthouse to get a kind of mock jury assessment of
their claims at a very reasonable price (free for making the case accessible to the general
pool of volunteer jurors; $200 for a demographically selected jury that participates in a sort
of chat room deliberation). As was true for the settlement-based sites, see sources cited
supra note 228, attorneys may already have engaged in conventional discovery before using
I-Courthouse to evaluate their cases. See I-Courthouse, supra note 155.
3 Seee.g., Internet Neutral, at http://www.internetneutral.com (last visited Nov. 27,
2000); Onlineresolution, Mediation: Welcome to Online Mediation, at
http://www.onlineresolution.com/index-om.cfm (last visited Nov. 27, 2000); SquareTrade,
at http://www.squaretrade.com/leammore/odr_090600.jsp (last visited Nov. 27, 2000).
The fees charged by these mediators vary. See, e.g., Internet Neutral, How Much Will This
Cost?, at http://www.internetneutral.com/fees.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2000) (listing
$250/hr fee for online mediation other than by email and per-minute fee chart for online
mediation by email only); Onlineresolution, About Us: Costs for ADR Services, at
http://www.onlineresolution.com/costs.cfm (last visited Nov. 27, .2000) ($50/hr for
disputes under $10,000, $75/hr for disputes between $10,000 and $50,000, and $100/hr for
disputes above $50,000); SquareTrade, Pricing for SquareTrade Mediation, at
http://cf.squaretrade.com/assign mediator/mediation pricing.cfm (last visited Nov. 27,
2000) (listing various fees depending on where transaction took place). For an example of
an intermediary undertaking investigatory activities, see the transcript of the first online
mediation (by e-mail) undertaken by the Online Ombuds Office at the University of
Massachusetts, Transcript of a Dispute, at http://aaron.sbs.umass.edu/center/ombuds
/narrativel.html (July-Aug. 1996).
'2 Indeed, bolstering the consumer's faith in Internet purchases seems to be the goal of
industry groups working on e-commerce dispute resolution. See, e.g., Introduction to
Guidelines, supra note 202 ("Consumer protection, which generates consumer confidence, is
as critical for the continued growth of electronic commerce as are traffic lights and rules of
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of a complex and defective product.
4. Collective Action
One of the ways to change the ratio of product cost to dispute-related
transaction costs is through collective action. In other words, if one
purchaser of a $50 defective widget is unhappy, it seems irrational to
spend $10,000 resolving her claim. However, if 100,000 purchasers of
that widget are unhappy, the $10,000 seems more reasonable. The
problem of the potential defendant who does a small amount of harm to
a large number of people is one reason that courts allow class actions.2
The potential for class actions is also exactly the reason some
businesses require arbitration rather than litigation of consumer
disputes. Consider this advice given to businesses developing
commercial Web sites: "Companies should consider including dispute
resolution clauses requiring arbitration, which may, in some instances,
serve as a defense to the certification of a class action against the site
owner." 2 Shrinkwrap with an arbitration clause will often protect the
seller from a consumer class action. While a few courts have allowed
class arbitration,2m many have found that the existence of the arbitration
clause precludes a class action.3
Without the ability to bring a class claim, consumers are deprived of a
mechanism that helps undo the repeat player advantage. A single
the road to traffic on a concrete highway.").
-3 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (discussing subdivision (b)(1)).
' Dreben & Werbach, supra note 130, at 19; see also Budnitz, supra note 141, at 268
("Arbitration programs [imposed by financial institutions] were initially intended to avoid
class action lender liability suits demanding punitive damages.").
"' See Blue Cross of Ca. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779 (Ct. App. 1998)
(allowing class action because arbitration agreement did not prohibit it); Navarro-Rice v.
First USA Bank, No. 97009-06901 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that bank added arbitration
clause after class action was filed), cited in Mark E. Budnitz, Recent Developments in
Consumer Arbitration Case Law: 1997-Jan. 1999, in PRACTICING LAW INsT., CORPORATE LAW
AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 744 (Apr.-May 1999), WL 1113 PLI/Corp 725; see
also Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class
Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2000).
See Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 275-77 (7th Cir. 1995) (denying class
certification in arbitration proceeding because no provision for such certification in
arbitration agreement); Lieschke v. Realnetworks, Inc., Nos. 99 C 7274, 99 C 7380 (N.D. Ill.
2000), 2000 WL 198424 (dismissing as unnecessary and premature plaintiffs' motion
regarding future court proceedings); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1410
(M.D. Ala. 1997) (denying class certification because agreement between parties did not
provide for class certification for arbitration purposes); Med Ctr. Cars v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9
(Ala. 1998) (holding plaintiffs not entitled to class-wide arbitration).
2 None of the other processes allows for class treatment. The ICANN process does
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consumer may easily decide that the costs of arbitration are too high
given her personal stake in the outcome. Consumers are also deprived
of a dispute structure that changes availability of discovery. Where
discovery is allowed at all in arbitration, it is apt to be discovery that is
reasonable in relation to the amount in controversy and the resources of
the parties.) Discovery that would be denied for the single claim might
be permitted for a class claim. Limiting arbitration to a single transaction
by a single buyer provides a double advantage to the seller; fewer claims
will be filed, and those that are filed are less likely to succeed.
5. Meaningful Hearings
Conventional litigation includes, as a matter of fairness, a right to
present evidence to the fact finder and to respond to evidence offered by
one's opponent. In an adversarial system, the reliability of evidence is
tested through the combined effects of physical presence, oath, cross-
examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact. The
DMCA and trusted systems allow no presentation at all, and hence no
use of hearings to test evidence. The ICANN process and consumer
arbitration, however, purport to include adversarial fact-finding, but the
fact finder acts either without a live hearing or with a sharply curtailed
one. When the operative facts are essentially uncontested, a decision
based on written statements should be sufficient. When facts are
disputed, however, the lack of a hearing can distort the fact finding
process.
Under the ICANN dispute resolution procedure, any kind of hearing
would be highly unusual. The ICANN Rules virtually prohibit video
conferences, telephone conferences, and Web conferences. z39 Instead of
hearing witnesses, the arbitrator makes her decision based on written
submissions and accompanying documents. The pleadings are not even
made under oath, but rather under an assertion of good faith similar to a
federal court Rule 11 assertion.
Arbitration, as always, depends on the rules agreed to by the parties.
While traditional commercial arbitration may include an elaborate
hearing that is hardly different from a non-jury trial to the court,
allow the trademark owner to include multiple domain names in the same complaint, as
long as they are all owned by the same person. ICANN Rules, supra note 33, at § 3(c). The
DMCA take-down process works on an individual web site basis. The trusted systems'
automated self-help works computer-by-computer.
' See, e.g., NAF Code of Procedure, supra note 160, Rule 29.
_ ICANN Rules, supra note 33, § 13.
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consumer arbitration clauses are apt to prohibit or limit hearings.240 Even
when a hearing is provided, it is more likely to be an opportunity to
orally present one's claim, and to listen to the other side present its
claim, than a chance to cross-examine witnesses.24' The procedure
provided may be called a hearing but is actually a "document hearing," a
euphemism for the arbitrator sitting down and reading the relevant
papers. A hearing may also be an "online hearing," in which the parties
participate through e-mail.24 Another way arbitration rules limit the
scope and content of the hearing is through time limits. Arbitration
providers may severely limit the number of minutes available to both
243
sides to present their cases in small consumer disputes. None of these
processes is well suited to resolve contested facts.2
How might this lack of an evidentiary hearing impact consumers?
First, it deprives them of the chance to "tell their story" that is an
important part of a litigants' feeling that they have been given
245
meaningful hearings. Second, procedures that make it harder to
present a sufficient quantum of credible information will systemically
hurt the party with the burden of proof. If the consumer's complaint
was drafted by the consumer herself, without lawyer assistance, it may
, The consumer arbitration service provided by the Better Business Bureau, however,
generally uses live hearings and allows the party to present witnesses as well as to question
the witnesses presented by the other party. Better Business Bureau, Rules of Arbitration
[Binding] § 20 (1998), http://www.bbb.org/complaints/bindarb.asp (last visited Nov. 27,
2000) [hereinafter BBB Rules].
"' See, e.g., Guidelines, supra note 202, Commentary to Guidelines (stating that "procedure
allows parties to present their arguments and facts to the forum and to hear the arguments
and facts of the other party"). Under the AAA's own rules for consumer arbitration, the
default "desk hearing" (covered by the $125 fee) involves only the arbitrator reviewing the
documents. For an extra $100, either party can secure a telephone hearing. The only way
to get an in-person hearing is to switch to the gigantically more expensive Commercial
Arbitration Rules.
" Under NAF rules, for example, hearings for claims less than one million U.S. dollars
will be conducted online unless all parties agree otherwise. NAF Code of Procedure, supra
note 160, Rule 26. Online hearings are conducted using e-mail or other electronic means.
Id. Rule 2.
NAF limits consumer hearings (for which one must pay extra) to a maximum of one
hour if the claim is for less than $5,000. Id. Rule 34.
, Appellate courts, for example, are not permitted to substitute their own factual
findings for those of the trial court because the written record is inherently less reliable
than the live observation of the witnesses. Arbitration procedures can go even farther, and
substitute canned written statements, that cannot be cross-examined, for live interactions.
... See generally E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of
Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 953, 980-91 (1990); Tom R.
Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment
Hearings, 46 SMU L. REv. 433, 439-42 (1992).
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seem less "credible" compared to the seller's response, where legal
involvement is more likely. The writing may be less clear or less
sophisticated; it may include facts that are not legally relevant, or it may
omit facts that would have been both relevant and helpful. Even clearly
drafted consumer statements are less helpful than live testimony and a
chance to challenge defense witnesses. As the consumer has the burden
of proof, any weakness, or even any "tie" in terms of the weight of the
written evidence will go to the seller. Further, if the arbitrator has any
pro-defendant bias, the lack of live evidence may make it less likely that
the consumer's presentation can counteract that bias.
The industry trend seems to be toward more rather than less
automation of arbitration processes. There is already substantial use of
an all-paper decision absent a live hearing. Use of an online process to
resolve online disputes is also mentioned often, purportedly as a way to
solve the problem of consumer inconvenience or overcome personal
jurisdiction limits.246 When technology will allow computers to actually
resolve the dispute itself, that will be the next step. The consumer would
still instigate the arbitration procedure, probably paying the filing fee
with some form of electronic cash. Then each party could be directed to
answer a series of questions, the answers to which are deemed relevant
to the outcome. For example, if dealing with a dispute about a
computer, its peripherals, or anything that can run on it, the dispute
resolution program would also have access through the Internet to the
247consumer's computer to help it make a determination about the claim.
Then the program would take that information and determine the
outcome. 2  The seller, as the party who writes the contract and thus
chooses the arbitration rules would get to write the program.
26 See, e.g., Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Rusticum Judicium? Private "Courts" Enforcing
Private Law and Rights: Regulating Virtual Arbitration in Cyberspace, 24 O-o N.U. L. REv. 769,
785 (1998) (noting that consumers can participate from home); Krebs, supra note
202("Maybe the answer would be to have a new Cyber court to handle these disputes")
(quoting Nancy Ellis of Webdispute.com); Brandon Mitchener, Cybercourts Emerge As Way
to Resolve Internet Disputes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2000, at B9.
247 This part would not work for a dispute concerning hard goods merely ordered over
the Internet. In those cases the computer would have to decide based on the party's
allegations. But that is what the arbitrator does now in cases involving only "document
hearings" (aka "desk hearings").
" The parties would be notified of the result by e-mail or its future technological
equivalent.
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6. Unbiased Decision Makers
Due Process also requires a neutral decision maker. 49 Among other
things, this requires that the tribunal not have a personal interest in the
outcome.7 It also requires an unbiased decision maker. Sometimes bias
is direct: the arbitrator has a prior financial relationship with one of the
parties or a financial stake in the dispute. 25 For example, direct bias
could be found in an arbitral system in which "in house" arbitrators are
employed by the defendant company. Other times it is indirect, growing
out of "such subtle heuristics as cultural and professional biases."
The DMCA take-down provisions empower a directly biased decision
maker. The ISP is the decision maker in considering how to react to the
complaint filed by the copyright holder. It is not required to take down
the site, but if it does so it receives immunity from suit. If it does not
take down the site, it is potentially liable for damages for copyright
infringement.M Thus the ISP itself is directly affected by its decision
whether to disable the Web site.
Contract-based arbitration of consumer disputes may involve a more
subtle kind of direct bias. Responsible providers of arbitral services have
codes of ethics requiring arbitrators to disclose any direct conflicts of
interest such as prior representation of a party, a financial stake in the
outcome, or family relationship to a party.i5 Rather, the kind of direct
bias arises from the volume of business that a repeat player can
bestow.25  Sellers write the contracts with the arbitration clauses and
thus get to choose the arbitration provider; "in this era of entrepreneurial
ADR, the arbitrator often does have a subtle but substantial economic
interest in the outcome of the case in that his or her ability to get future
.. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,522-23 (1927) (holding that when judge is compensated
from proceeds of fines, accused is denied due process of law).
"5 Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 1058 (2000).
252 Id.
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(b) (West Supp. 2000).
The Federal Arbitration Act makes "evident partiality" by the arbitrator a ground to
set aside an arbitral award. See Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor
Servs., 146 F.3d 1309, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 1998). However, this provision has been narrowly
construed. Id. at 1312. An allegation of arbitrator bias might not be enough to prevent the
arbitration from proceeding to a decision. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 583 F. Supp.
1092, 1094-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
1 Garth, supra note 141, at 382 ("If decision makers depend on a certain clientele for
their business, and that clientele has a particular perspective or long-standing practice, we
should not be surprised if that perspective or practice is not challenged.").
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cases depends, at least in part, on party satisfaction."26 It is not the one-
shot consumer that the arbitrator needs to satisfy for business
development; it is the repeat player seller who is capable of bringing
numerous cases to the arbitrator.
Indirect bias is harder to pin down. Arbitrators, unlike conventional
judges, are often valued for their substantive expertise in the subject
area. The expertise is considered to be a positive factor, but it comes
with a flip side; with expertise can come bias. For example, 89% of the
arbitrators in the securities industry have been shown to be white males
with an average age of sixty, many of whom spent their professional
careers in the brokerage industry.25 It would not be surprising if former
brokers were more likely to sympathize with the broker's side of the
dispute. In health care arbitration, it would not be surprising if doctor-
arbitrators were more likely to sympathize with the doctor's side of the
dispute.
Is indirect bias likely to be a problem in any of the privatized systems?
It would be interesting to study the identity and backgrounds of the
arbitrators participating in the ICANN cases (and it may vary by
provider). Are they trademark lawyers? If so, do they tend to represent
parties taking a particular position in trademark litigation? Are they
former judges? Academics? Is there any statistically significant
correlation between the arbitrators' backgrounds and their decisions in
contested cases? Various commentators have begun to point to the fact
that WIPO is far more likely to rule for the trademark owner than are the
other providers 5 9 Similarly, a study of arbitrators in consumer disputes
would be interesting. Are they tilted toward corporate defense
lawyers?260
If there is an indirect bias of the arbitrators in the ICANN process and
consumer arbitration, repeat players, with their informational advantage
are in the best position to capitalize on it. In the ICANN process, it is the
Reuben, supra note 251, at 1063.
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, for example, alleges that the National Arbitration
Forum markets its arbitration services as providing a defense for financial services
companies against lawsuits from their consumers, and that MCI has a very close financial
relationship with its mandatory arbitration service provider. TLPJ Letter to FTC, supra note
209, at 8-9.
Im U.S. GEN. AccouNTNG OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: How REGISTERED
REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DISPurES 2 (1994).
'1 See McCarthy, supra note 164; Naylor, supra note 62 (asserting that 83% of WIPO
complaints result in findings for complainant).
I' TLPJ Letter to FTC, supra note 209, at 8.
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trademark owner who gets to choose the dispute resolution provider.261
The trademark holder has the expertise to access and analyze the
outcome of prior ICANN proceedings and take advantage of any
perceived patterns. For example, if statistics would show that WIP 2 62
arbitrators were more likely to rule for trademark holders than
eResolution arbitrators, trademark holders would file with WIPO. 263 In
consumer dispute arbitration, the seller has already chosen the provider.
Once that is done, individual arbitrators may be assigned, subject to
challenge. Alternatively, parties may be permitted to choose from a list.
The consumer is unlikely to have any information about the prior rulings
or background of the suggested arbitrators. The seller, however, may
have a record or other source of information on arbitrator-by-arbitrator
•. 264
decisions. This superior knowledge about the general attitudes and
tendencies of the arbitrator gives a further advantage to the repeat
player.
7. Process Transparency
In addition to the litigants' interest in disputes, the public has an
interest in the fairness of the process, the subjects under dispute, and the
outcome of those disputes. When disputes are litigated in a court, the
public generally has access to this information. Privatized processes, in
contrast, allow the parties to keep the matter secret. This may result in
the public, or even the government, lacking information about important
issues of public health or safety or product reliability.26s It may allow
companies who have committed hard-to-discover wrongs to hide the
problem from a greater number of people. It allows material to be
ICANN Policy, supra note 32, § 4(d).
26 "The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is an international
organization dedicated to promoting the use and protection of works of the human spirit."
WIPO, About WIPO, at http://www.wipo.org/about-wipo/en (last visited Nov. 27, 2000).
26 See McCarthy, supra note 164 ("One rule of domain name argument is that the
complainant can decide which body to take its dispute to. Is it any surprise then that big,
powerful companies choose WIPO when it has a crystal-clear policy of favouring Goliath
over David."); see also Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: An Analysis of ICANN's Uniform
Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://dcc.syr.edu/roughjustice.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2000)
(finding forum shopping and bias in ICANN dispute resolution process).
'" For example, filings with the FCC allege that MCI's dispute resolution provider gave
MCI quarterly reports on the dispute outcomes, and specially trained arbitrators who
would hear MCI cases. It also received financial benefits if it asserted jurisdiction over
cases brought to it by MCI. Reuben, supra note 251, at 1059 n.531.
_ For this reason, some state judicial systems have even put limits on the ability of




removed from public access without public knowledge. It also allows
questionable processes to persist free of public scrutiny.266 This section
assesses the comparative transparency of the Internet processes,
considering the amount of information available to the public and the
content of that information.
ICANN is to be commended for its policy making most decisions
267freely available on the Internet at its Web site. In addition, the ICANN
decisions tend to set out the allegations of the parties and describe the
supporting documents, and they explain the arbitrator's reasons for her
decision. This process, then, is largely transparent.
The other three processes, however, proceed in secrecy. In the DMCA
cases, the copyright holder privately complains to the ISP which
privately disables the Web site. Only if a counter notification forces a
lawsuit is there any potential public access to information about the
copyright holder's claims and the Web site's defenses. The trusted
system automatically "resolves" the dispute through its ability to control
the software; it happens automatically in the licensee's home or office.
One would have to read the code to understand the process. This is
about as opaque as a system can get.
Arbitration providers advertise privacy as one of their major
advantages.26' In truly consensual arbitration proceedings, secrecy may
be desired by both parties. In the kind of consumer arbitration discussed
here, it is the seller/contract drafter who has chosen the secret process.
If 1,000 lawsuits were filed against a manufacturer, the public would
certainly find out. If 1,000 claims in arbitration were filed against the
same company, it is much more easily hidden. Further, the arbitration
processes themselves tend to be relatively opaque. Each party presents
its position, but there is no record made of the proceeding, and generally
the arbitrator need not explain her decision. Where the arbitrator has
drawn on her own expertise, in addition to material submitted by the
parties, there is no information about what, if anything, the arbitrator
considered.
Opaque processes are also a problem for the parties. It is difficult to know whether
one has been treated fairly, and difficult to know the reason one won or lost.
267 The arbitrator does have the discretion to order, if a sufficient showing is made, that
a decision not be published.
I See, for example, the NAF chart on "arbitration vs. litigation," National Arbitration
Forum, About the Forum: Choose the Forum, http://www.arbforum.com/about/index.html
(last visited Nov. 21, 2000).
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There is a growing trend toward encouraging arbitrators in consumer
cases to at least briefly explain their decisions. For example, the AAA
Statement of Principles state that at "the timely request of either party,
the arbitrator should provide a brief written explanation of the basis for
the award." 270 Similarly, the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution rules
require that the arbitrator "shall state the reasoning on which the award
rests unless the parties agree otherwise."27 From a democratic
standpoint, a written opinion helps demonstrate that the private process
was legitimate, rational, and fair. It can help either or both parties guide
their future conduct. Public availability of opinions might also narrow
the knowledge gap between the parties when choosing arbitrators.2
Currently there is no requirement that opinions be explained, and
contract drafting parties can even prohibit the publication of opinions.m
The result is "maximum freedom and minimal public scrutiny for the
institutions with the economic power to take full advantage of what
private dispute resolution has to offer."274
D. Loss of Government Control over Law
The privatization of dispute resolution transfers control over the
process from the courts to the party who creates the procedural rules.
Perhaps less obviously, it also transfers control over the substantive rules
applied within those processes. Part of the appeal of the private systems
is their ability to circumvent the law that would otherwise apply. The
result is a depreciation of public order; "The disputants, through
The consumer arbitration rules of the Better Business Bureau do require that the
arbitrator render a written decision that explains the reasons for the award. BBB Rules,
supra note 240, § 28.
AAA Statement of Principles, supra note 204, Principle 15. This is an interesting
development, as AAA rules for consumer disputes do not require the arbitrator to explain
her decision. Indeed, the former tendency was not to explain so as to make it harder to
show, on appeal, that the arbitrator did not follow the law. Statutorily, neither the Federal
Arbitration Act nor the state laws under the Uniform Arbitration Act require arbitrators to
make findings of fact or conclusions of law or otherwise to reveal the reasoning behind
their awards. Reuben, supra note 251, at 1083.
r Id. at 1084.
Granted, trial level decisions in courts are not always informative. A general jury
verdict merely finds for one of the parties. However, it will be based on a theoretically
complete explanation of the law to be applied. A trial court decision in a non-jury trial
generally includes some mechanism for requiring the judge to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law. See, e.g, FED. R. CIV. P. 52; TEx. R. CIv. P. 296.
27 In addition, contract drafting parties can also charge extra for an opinion and thus
discourage the consumer from requesting an explanation.
7' Garth, supra note 141, at 386.
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contract, create private law and private courts to adjudicate their
dispute, and, so long as their own private laws are applied, they have
contracted for and achieved private justice adjudicated by a ... decision-
maker of their choice." m A court would apply, to the best of its ability,
the law created by the government, whether through legislation,
regulation, or common law. Even when considering the parties'
contractual agreement, courts will sometimes refuse to enforce it because
it is overridden by mandatory law. 276  However, mandatory law is
jeopardized when private processes and private decision makers are
involved. The private system allows the more powerful party to avoid
the impact of what would have been mandatory law.
7
In all of the processes considered by this article, privately-chosen rules
are being substituted for public law. ICANN's Policy and Rules were
developed by a private body.'78 Many groups had input into these rules,
but they were not primarily looking out for the interests of the public at
large. Each private participant has its own agenda; "[t]he dearth of
consumer representatives, public interest groups, and citizens groups...
should serve to remind us all of the many reasons why we entrust major
aspects of social policy making to elected officials."27 Now the
arbitrators privately accredited by ICANN, and privately chosen by
trademark owners, are creating their own body of ICANN common law.
With a body of hundreds of decided cases, ICANN arbitrators have
25 Gibbons, supra note 246, at 772. Note the dream of one technology believer: "[T]hink
about the impact on commerce of laws that... are algorithmically defined and enforced
with certainty, anywhere and everywhere. Imagine laws in which mobs of uninvolved
third parties have no say, have no power and have to mind their own business." Frezza,
supra note 18.
276 Mandatory rules are also called "market-inalienable." Rights that are "governed by
an immutable rule are 'market-inalienable' because they cannot be traded as part of a
contractual exchange. Rights governed by default rules are 'alienable' because parties may
alter the rules as part of a market transaction." G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modem
Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REv. 431, 444 (1993). Privatized processes which deter the parties
from resorting to the court system increase the power of the market and thus make more
rules alienable.
' Ware, supra note 13, at 711; see also Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract
and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. CT. REv. 331, 338 (asserting that enforcement of arbitration
agreements allows parties "to contract out of effective private enforcement of regulations
adverse to their interests").
' Not surprisingly, at least one ICANN complainant has already responded to a
domain holder's claim of a first amendment right to expression by arguing that as a private
body, ICANN cannot violate the first amendment. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Walsucks, Case
No. D2000-0477 (WIPO July 20, 2000), http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions
/html/d2000-0477.html
2" Froomkin, supra note 23, at 628.
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begun to cite other ICANN arbitrators.2° Although they also may cite to
national law, it is clear that "the law of ICANN" is developing as a body
of law about domain names, separate and apart from the law of any
country or from any international treaty.21 For example, some ICANN
decisions have gone beyond the provisions of the ICANN Policy,
protecting people's names and geographic names when the policy does
not do so. ICANN arbitrators transferred domain names when there
has been no use of the name, despite the policy's requirement that the
respondent have registered and used the name in bad faith.23 And the
ICANN arbitrators appear to have little sympathy for the free speech
interests of those who register domains for the purpose of criticizing an
entity.
21
In the area of copyright, both the notice and take-down provisions of
the DMCA and the planned operation of trusted systems allow contract
to triumph over copyright. Web sites that infringe no copyright are
summarily removed from the public eye. No access to copyrighted
works is granted without permission. Professor Lessig identifies the
costs of such far reaching control by the copyright holder asserting that:
I" Michael Geist, Domain name wars heat up, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, May 4, 2000,
available at http:/ /www.globetechnology.com/archive/gam/E-Business/20000504
/TWGEIS.html (remarking that early cases are forming basis for new global cyberlaw, with
standards and legal tests divorced from traditional intellectual property law); see, e.g.,
3636275 Canada v. eResolution.com, Case No. D2000-0110 (WIPO Apr. 10, 2000),
http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-ol10.html (finding in favor
of complainant, doing business as "eResolution," and stating that "Although entitled to
consider principles of law deemed applicable, the Panel finds it unnecessary to do so in any
depth. The jurisprudence which is being rapidly developed by a wide variety of Panelists
world-wide under the ICANN Policy provides a fruitful source of precedent.").
'1 This could create a strange situation where a party actually files a lawsuit to avoid
the result of the ICANN decision. That lawsuit will be decided under the laws of some
actual country, which may differ from the domain name policy. The WIPO global
standards may work only as long as they're not challenged.
Laurie J. Flynn, Trademarks Winning Domain Fights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,2000, available
at http:/ /www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/09/biztech/articles/O4neco.html.
Tiller, supra note 38, at 595-96.
See, e.g., Steven Bonisteel, Guinness "Sucks" Domain Disputes Come to a Head,
NEWSBYTES, Aug. 28, 2000, at http://www.newsbytes.com/pubNews/00/154332.html
(also discussing FreeserveSucks.com, DixonsSucks.com, NatWestSucks.com,
StandardCharteredSucks.com); Flynn, supra note 282 (noting critics' claim that WIPO
decisions de-emphasize free speech in favor of commercial interests); John Partridge,
"Cybergripers" lose rights, THE GLOBE AND MAiL, Aug. 19, 2000, available at
http://www.globetechnology.com/archive/gam/News/20000819/RGRIP.html; David
Streitfeld, Making Bad Names for Themselves: Firms Preempt Critics with Nasty Domains,
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 8, 2000, at A01.
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From the economic perspective, [the development of trusted
systems] threatens to empower individual authors against the
interests of the class; from the constitutional perspective, it threatens
to bottle up speech regardless of its relation to matters of public
import; and from the perspective of the [intellectual] commons, it
fundamentally changes the nature of access ....
Trusted systems ... are forms of privatized law.2
The parties' agreement is said to trump the content of copyright law, as if
there were no federal component to it and no interests involved other
than those of the contracting parties.2 Further, the potential for the anti-
circumvention provisions of the DMCA to suppress'speech has already
become clear in the first-litigated case on the issue.
Even within the realm of contract law, the loss of court supervision is a
serious matter.] From the standpoint of the legal system, as well as for
individual transactions, private systems eliminate the ability of courts to
apply mandatory contract and consumer protection law. A court might
hold that certain contract terms are unenforceable, or that certain
warranties cannot be disclaimed, or that certain remedies cannot be
waived. It might require certain indications of true consent or adequate
notice before other terms are enforced.2 When these values are
incorporated into published opinions, they help not only the individual
consumer in the case before the court but also consumers as a group.
When a private arbitrator rules, it binds no one other than the parties
Lessig, supra note 5, at 529.
For an argument that federal copyright law preempts certain kinds of contract terms
that would be allowed under UCITA, see Garry L. Founds, Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap
Agreements: 2B or Not 2B?, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 99 (1999).
1 Damien Cave, A bug in the legal code?, SALON, Sept. 13, 2000, at
http:/ /www.salon.com/tech/feature/2000/09/13/touretzky/print.html (discussing
DeCSS/DVD case).
From a systemic perspective, it decreases the supply of case precedent that guides
commercial actors in planning their conduct and informs consumers of their rights. Chris
A. Carr & Michael R. Jencks, The Privatization of Business and Commercial Dispute Resolution:
A Misguided Policy Decision, 88 Ky. L.J. 183, 188 (1999-2000).
Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 668, 676 (1986)("[I]f ADR is extended to resolve difficult issues of constitutional or
public law-making use of nonlegal values to resolve important social issues or allowing
those the law seeks to regulate to delimit public rights and duties-there is real reason for
concern. An oft-forgotten virtue of adjudication is that it ensures the proper resolution and
application of private values.")
2000]
University of California, Davis
before her. Even if she were to rule for the consumer, it would create no
precedent. Further, the arbitrator, applying the private law contained in
the terms and conditions page, or trusted systems software applying its
program, need not apply laws benefiting consumers.
Some arbitration providers represent that the arbitrators will apply the
applicable law, although this would include the provisions of the
contract. Under the AAA rules of consumer arbitration, for example, the
arbitrator is to apply "any identified, pertinent contract terms, statutes,
and legal precedents." The National Arbitration Forum also advertises
that its arbitrators are supposed to apply applicable law."' The former
online service, Cybertribunal (perhaps because it was administered by a
law faculty), said that it would apply the law agreed to by the parties or,
absent agreement, the "national law with which the conflict has the
closest links."
292
Arbitrators, in fact, need not apply the law at all. The consumer
arbitration service offered by the Better Business Bureau provides in its
rules that "[a]rbitrators are not bound to apply legal principles in
reaching what the arbitrator considers to be a fair resolution of the
dispute."2 9 3 Online services may also be law-free. The original online
dispute resolution service, the Virtual Magistrate, said that it would
apply a standard of "reasonableness in light of all available
information."29 The volunteer jurors for I-Courthouse cases are
provided with no "law" to guide them. According to its CEO, the site
"decided to avoid jurisdictional issues by not having applicable law."2 9 5
Whether or not the arbitrator theoretically applies any law outside the
contract, an error of law is not a ground for vacating the award.26 Only
by showing "manifest disregard of law" - that the arbitrator knew
what the law was and deliberately choose not to apply it - will legal
I American Arbitration Association, Arbitration Rules for the Resolution of Consumer-
Related Disputes § 13(c), http://www.adr.org/rules/commercial/000411ab.htm (Apr. 1,
2000).
" National Arbitration Forum, An Overview of the Forum,
http://www.arbforum.com/about/index.html (last visited Nov. 27,2000).
1 Donahey, supra note 156, at 125(noting that Cybertribunal has been succeeded by
eResolution).
BBB Rules, supra note 240, § 28..
Alejandro Almaguer & Roland W. Baggott I, Shaping New Legal Frontiers: Dispute
Resolution for the Internet, 13 O-o ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 711, 726 (1998).
"' E-mail from Clyde Long, CEO, I-Courthouse, to Beth Thornburg, (Mar. 26, 2000,
13:25:00 PST) (on file with author).
Ware, supra note 13, at 723.
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error serve as the basis for vacating an arbitral award.9 In a system in
which no transcript of the proceedings is kept and awards are not
explained, it will be a highly unusual case in which the manifest
disregard test is met. 8
Some parties are willing to be bound by some jurisdictions' actual law,
but want to avoid laws that it finds unappealing. Such a company can
bolster its chances of success through careful use of choice of law and
choice of forum clauses. This is a device for circumventing jurisdictions
that would override contractual choices with mandatory law. The first
step would be to choose favorable applicable law in the contract. The
second step would be to choose arbitration in a forum that will enforce
that choice of law clause, and not override the chosen law with some
public policy based device." A defecting party with access to a forum
that will insist on invalidating the arbitration clause and applying some
less favorable law is still a danger, but many nations and states already
enforce choice of forum and arbitration clauses." Jurisdictions wanting
to attract e-businesses may help this process along by passing statutes
that facilitate the enforcement of such clauses, leading to a kind of race to
the bottom in accommodating corporate desires.3°1
When governments lose control over disputes, they lose a large
amount of control over the law. This is particularly true in a country like
the United States in which much of the implementation and enforcement
of legal norms is left to private litigation. The trend in Internet dispute
resolution to move disputes out of the courts and into private processes
is changing not only the litigants' own process rights but also the
substantive law.
' Id. n.19. See generally Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for
Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 774-78 (1996) (describing
development of "manifest disregard" of law construct).
Empirical studies, however, have long demonstrated that arbitrators often do not
apply the law. See, e.g., Heinrich Kronstein, Arbitration Is Power, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 661, 669-
79 (1963); Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLuM. L. REV. 846, 865-67 (1961).
If this chosen forum is an inconvenient distance from the consumer's residence, it
has the added bonus of creating more disincentives to the consumer even pursuing a claim.
For a discussion of the probable efficacy of this plan, see Jack L. Goldsmith, Against
Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CI. L. REV. 1199, 1245-46 (1998).
•' Cf. Froomkin, supra note 23, at 623 (discussing possible sources of harmonization of
global law). Note, for example, that in being the first state to adopt UCITA, Virginia hopes
that it will "further its reputation as a center of high-technology and attract more
businesses to the state." Craig Timberg, Gilmore Signs 1st Internet Commercial Code Into Law,
WASHINGTON PosT, Mar. 14, 2000, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A6866-2000Mar14.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2000).
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CONCLUSION
Privatization is indeed all the rage, but some of its manifestations need
to go the way of the pet rock. Professor Lessig states that there must be
limits to privatization; "[Jiust as we don't privatize every public park,
every street, and every idea, we can't privatize every feature of
cyberspace." 30 2 The privatization currently reigning on the Internet is not
the kind of libertarian Nirvana envisioned by Net architects. The old-
style libertarians are busy designing open source code, creating
programs that provide free access to music even more untraceably than
Napster, and acting as vigilantes in the war against spam. The new
privatization is instead the anti-regulation sentiment of corporate actors
seeking to maximize their profits.
This is not an area where we can ex ect industry self-regulation to
provide adequate limits to overreaching. Evidence of market choices is
already emerging. Trademark owners strive to stretch local marks to
global control through the dot-com domain name. Copyright owners are
preparing to license every conceivable use of copyrighted material and
to use self-help to avoid outside supervision.Nm And merchants are using
standardized contracts to impose both substantive and procedural terms
that dilute the rights of the consumer. Companies purporting to adopt
consumer-friendly "best practices" are agreeing to little more than the
bare minimum required by the most lenient jurisdiction's law.3
Consumer transactions in particular often take place under conditions of
pervasive, persistent market failures which prevent an economically
rational outcome from being reached through pure market forces.
30 6
Lessig, supra note 8, at 1420.
Given the trend toward privatization, a developing body of case law will also not be
available to create a useful set of legal limits. Many disputes will not reach courts,
especially courts that issue published decisions. Further, courts are by their nature limited
to deciding the cases before them on the facts before them and are thus less able to
implement rules that have a broader effect.
' They have also quietly succeeded in significantly extending the temporal length of
copyright protection. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §101 (Supp. IV 1998)).
' Guidelines, supra note 202. Professor David Sorkin commented that the Guidelines
"fall far short of the protections guaranteed to consumers under existing law in many
jurisdictions, and may be applied in ways that prevent consumers from asserting their
rights under these existing laws." Chris Oakes, Net Guidelines a Good Start, WiRED, June 7,
2000, available at http:/ /www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,36811,00.html (last visited
Nov. 27,2000).
' The factors creating these market failures include information asymmetries, unequal
bargaining power, and collective action problems that prevent consumers from banding
together to bargain as a group for fair terms from merchants. Memorandum from
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Both code and contract can be controlled 3. Governments can provide
minimum acceptable standards even for private systems of resolving
disputes,30' and can where appropriate prohibit the parties from using
technological devices to administer self-help remedies. Although
technology-specific regulation would be quickly outdated, certain
actions can be required or prohibited.M Further, governments can
identify substantive law that may not be varied by contract.
310
Professor Jane K. Winn, to Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Protection Division (May
20, 1999), at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/comments/ftcjwinn.htm (last visited Nov. 29,
2000); see also Sternlight, supra note 141, at 686-93 (discussing why market will not correct
power imbalances involved in consumer transactions).
The European Union, for example, requires that consumers be allowed to sue in
their home and that the law of the consumer's habitual residence be applied to the
transactions. Dreben & Werbach, supra note 130, at 19 ("A European Community directive
that has been implemented in all member states of the European Union mandates that the
choice of law is always the law of the domicile of the consumer in consumer contracts.");
see also Robert L. Hoegle & Christopher P. Boam, The Internet and Jurisdiction-International
Principles Emerge but Confrontation Looms, 3 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 31, 45-46 (2000)
(observing that draft EU directive would allow consumers to sue in their own national
courts, regardless of whether seller had "actively sought" to sell its product in that forum);
Paul Meller, Online Buyers Gain Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/01/technology/01NET.html (last visited Dec. 6,2000);
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Progressing Towards a Uniform Commercial Code for Electronic
Commerce or Racing Towards Nonuniformity?, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 635, 654-55 (1999)
(noting that under EU law, consumers receive the benefit of the protection of mandatory
rules of their own jurisdiction); Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International
Choice of Law and the Internet, 32 INTL LAw. 991, 994 (1998)(citing Rome Convention).
3 See Gibbons, supra note 246, at 775 (arguing that arbitration on Internet must be
responsive to some institution or policy outside will of contracting parties); Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 201, at 60 (recommending statutory changes in Federal Arbitration Act
to guarantee protections such as representation, discovery, written opinions, and more
meaningful judicial review); Radin & Wagner, supra note 15, at 1317 (suggesting
international system for minimum standards of due process and public policy limits on
Internet).
For an example of this kind of regulation (although an ill-conceived one), see the
Digital Millennial Copyright Act prohibition of devices that circumvent digital rights
management devices. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West Supp. 2000). The goal of the device, rather
than any particular mechanism, is what is prohibited by the statute.
310 For example, Germany's highest civil court has just ruled that Microsoft cannot
prevent dealers from unbundling the software and selling it separately. This appears to
enforce traditional first sale rights despite Microsoft's desire to interpret the transaction as
a license that limits future uses. See Rick Perera, German court says OK to unbundling,
INFOWORLD.COM, July 7,2000, at http://www.infoworld.com/articles/hn/xml/00/07/07
/000707hnunbundle.xml (last visited Nov. 27, 2000). Following this decision, prices for
various Windows programs have decreased from 20 - 30% as a secondary market develops.
John Lettice, German court ruling triggers 30% price cuts on Windows, THE REGISTER, Sept. 5,
2000, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/1/12985.html (last visited Nov. 1,
2000).
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Left unchecked, market forces and their legislative allies are ignoring
important public interests. The e-commerce boom comes with associated
costs, and absent government regulation the companies involved will
externalize those costs onto consumers and the public at large.
Governments need to impose certain standards, or technological choices
will make it increasingly difficult to embed important values in the
dispute resolution process. Reasonable minds can disagree about the
exact dimensions of government intervention that would protect
procedural due process guarantees and require the enforcement of
substantive norms. It is clear, however, that regulation is required. The
government has bent over backward in its effort to please the major
players on the Internet. It's time to lean the other way.
